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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARLA K. PARKER, : 
Petitioner/Appellee, : Case No. 981362-CA 
v. • : Priority No. 15 
DALE S. PARKER, : District Court No. 95-490-4494 
Respondent/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPELLEE#S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Appellee agrees with Appellant's Statement of 
Jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court abuse the broad discretion afforded it 
when it bifurcated the divorce proceedings and entered a Decree 
of Divorce prior to deciding the remaining property and debt 
distribution issues? 
II. Did the trial court abuse the broad discretion afforded it 
in determining that April 16, 1996, the date the Decree of Divorce 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was entered, was the proper date to use in valuing the marital 
estate? 
III. Did the trial court abuse the broad discretion afforded it 
in the way it valued and distributed the Murray Parkway real 
property? 
IV. Was there sufficient credible evidence to support the value 
the trial court placed•on the Murray Parkway real property? 
V. Did the trial court abuse the broad discretion afforded it 
in the manner in which it valued and distributed the various bank 
accounts of the parties? 
VI. Has the Appellant failed in his duty to marshall the evidence 
in order to demonstrate that the trial court erred in the manner 
it valued and distributed the Murray Parkway property and the 
various bank accounts of the parties? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appellee agrees with Appellant that there are no statutory 
or constitutional provisions determinative of the issues presented 
in connection with this appeal. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mrs. Parker seeks the following relief in connection with 
this appeal: 
1. For an order upholding the trial court's Findings and 
Conclusions in all respects; 
2. For an order affirming the trial court's decision and 
related orders in all respects; 
3. For an order awarding Mrs. Parker all of the attorney's 
fees and costs she has *been required to incur in connection with 
having to respond to Mr. Parker's appeal. 
4. For such other and further relief as this Court might 
deem appropriate under the circumstances of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of the 
Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Appellee agrees with Appellant's statement regarding the 
nature of the proceedings and disposition below. However Appellee 
supplements that statement with the following information which 
is pertinent to the issues presented for review. 
At trial, both sides requested property debt distributions 
that were significantly different in terms of not only what 
property each wanted to receive but also as to the value of that 
property and whether or not it should be included as a part of the 
marital estate. (See Ex. P-4A included in the Addendum to this 
Brief and Ex. D-10) . In its final decision, the trial court 
accepted portions of each side's respective proposals and rejected 
3 
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others. (See Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law; R-815-837 included in the Addendum to this Brief). 
Mrs. Parker has not filed a cross-appeal in connection with 
the trial court's decision. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Mr. Parker's Statement of Facts contains many references to 
the record and trial testimony which are really not relevant to 
the issues which he has raised on appeal. In addition, his 
Statement of Facts omits and fails to mention testimony and 
evidence presented by Mrs. Parker which are related to the issues 
on appeal and which supports and provides the basis for the trial 
court's decision related to the valuation and distribution of the 
parties' assets and liabilities. 
Consequently, Mrs. Parker will set forth her own Statement 
of Facts which will provide this Court with the evidence presented 
below on which the trial court based its decision and which Mr. 
Parker has neglected to mention. 
Marital History 
This case involved a marriage of 25 years during which Mrs. 
Parker raised three children and embarked on a career in real 
estate, first becoming an agent, then a broker and on occasion a 
developer (TR-17) . Mr. Parker, on the other hand was not inclined 
to pursue a career in those areas. Rather, he first began working 
in the construction industry and then in approximately 1986 began 
building homes (TR-658). He started his own construction business 
known as Aspen View Homes, Inc. (TR-658) Mrs. Parker established 
4 
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and operated her own real estate company consisting of Realty 
Brokers Performance; Realty Brokers Service; and R Brokers 
Partnership (TR-17). 
Because the parties' respective focuses were in different 
areas, they elected to keep their business and professional 
dealings separate from their personal, household dealings (TR-
674) . They each maintained separate bank accounts for their 
respective businesses (TR-176, 179) and any income either might 
earn was first deposited into their business accounts (TR-185) and 
then subsequently transferred into a family equipment leasing 
account to pay each of their auto expenses (TR-182) and into a 
joint account from which family expenses were paid (TR-4 08, 517, 
521, 830) . The parties would also cause their respective 
businesses to loan monies to the other's business from time to 
time (TR-20) and as would be expected in such a business setting, 
those loans would ultimately be repaid (TR-20). Mr. Parker did 
not want to be involved in Mrs. Parker's real estate business (TR-
183) other than from time to time to use her services in locating 
lots on which he could build homes and in locating potential 
buyers to purchase the homes which he built. (TR-358, 667) 
Mrs. Parker testified that Mr. Parker was never involved in 
her businesses and in fact did not encourage her to succeed in her 
endeavors (TR-73). She described him as a control person (TR-74). 
She said he did not want to be involved in the developments she 
put together other than to purchase lots so that he could build 
5 
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homes and earn income from the ultimate sale of the homes which 
he built. (TR-89) 
Mr. Parker was never a signatory on Mrs. Parker's business 
accounts. (TR-176) He had his own business/personal account from 
which he paid the expenses he incurred in acquiring lots, building 
homes as well as and some of his personal expenses. (TR-177) 
Mrs. Parker was also charged with the responsibility of keeping 
track of and paying all of the family bills from their joint 
account (TR 408, 830) .• She also put together all of the tax 
information so that their tax returns could be prepared and filed. 
(TR-193) Each of the parties' businesses filed separate tax 
returns. (TR-395) Mrs. Parker testified that on many occasions 
the parties' tax liabilities would be paid from Mrs. Parker's 
separate accounts. (TR-397, 517) 
Because of a different work ethic, Mrs. Parker testified that 
over the years she was the moving force in all of the different 
entities which she started and operated. (TR-444) 
Over time, the marriage relationship of the parties 
deteriorated. The parties separated and Mrs. Parker filed for a 
divorce in the fall of 1995. (R-l; TR-401) At that time, she was 
actively involved in her real estate business, listing, selling 
and brokering properties and attempting to subdivide and develop 
some undeveloped land located in Murray, Utah (the Murray Parkway 
property). She was earning commissions, securing listings and 
paying related business expenses as she had historically done and 
was beginning to work on developing the Murray parkway property. 
6 
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(TR-486) Likewise, at the time Mr. Parker was building homes and 
buying and selling lots in his business as he had historically 
done. (TR-542, 781, 838, Ex. D-16) 
At about this same time Mrs. Parker learned that Mr. Parker 
had become involved with one of her best friends, Ms. Tamara 
Torkelson. (TR-834) Mr. Parker had a line of credit on the 
marital residence with West One Bank. Mrs. Parker was an obligor 
on that line. Mr. Parker had used it in the past to purchase lots 
and pay for building expenses. At the time the divorce was filed, 
there was a $71,000.00 outstanding balance against the line. (TR-
4 91) Mr. Parker testified that he and Ms. Torkelson were going 
to use the line to fund a business venture involving the purchase 
of a lot and the construction of a home. (TR-142) 
Also at that time, Mr. Parker and Ms. Torkelson opened a 
joint bank account together. (TR-141) According to Ms. Torkelson, 
she then loaned Mr. Parker $8,000.00 to $10,000.00. (TR-143, 690) 
She also stated that Mr. Parker had put money into the joint 
account they had opened. (TR-154) During her testimony, Ms. 
Torkelson acknowledged that Mr. and Mrs. Parker had kept their 
finances and businesses separate throughout their marriage. (TR-
150, 603) 
Upon learning of these developments, Mrs. Parker, as a co-
signor, became concerned over Mr. Parker being able to draw on the 
line of credit and then transfer those funds over to the account 
he had with Ms. Torkelson. (TR-465) Consequently Mrs. Parker 
withdrew sufficient monies from Mr. Parker's business account, on 
7 
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which she was authorized to sign (TR-490) to pay off the balance 
on the line of credit and all of the parties' credit cards and 
marital debt. (TR-54) She further asked that the line be frozen 
to prevent her from having further liability on the line Mrs. 
Parker had originally co-signed on the line to allow Mr. Parker 
to qualify for the same. (TR-525) Mr. Parker admitted that all 
marital debts had been paid off by Mrs. Parker at the time of 
separation. (TR-843) 
Mr. Parker and Ms*. Torkelson testified at trial that their 
relationship was strictly a business relationship. (TR-142) 
However on cross examination, Mr. Parker did not deny the 
existence of a romantic relationship with Ms. Torkelson (TR-854). 
Also, he provided no documentation to reflect repayment of the 
loan he claimed she had earlier made to him, or what he had done 
with those monies. (TR-833) 
Ms. Torkelson had been Mrs. Parker's best friend. (TR-151) 
She had worked at Freedom Mortgage and had handled the financing 
of many of the real estate sales transactions in which Mrs. Parker 
had been involved in over the years. At trial, Ms. Torkelson 
denied a romantic relationship with Mr. Parker. She said they 
were merely close personal friends. (TR-601) Kevin Gates, the 
president of Freedom Mortgage, testified that he was required to 
terminate Ms. Torkelson because she had lied to customers on 
numerous occasions during the course of her employment. (TR-242-
243) He further testified that over the 16 years he had business 
8 
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dealings with Mrs. Parker, he found her to always have been honest 
and trustworthy. (TR-243) 
Murray Parkway Project 
There was substantial evidence presented at trial on the 
Murray Parkway property. Mr. Parker has provided this Court with 
only a portion of the evidence the trial court considered in 
deciding how that asset should be valued and distributed. The 
property consisted of • approximately 32.5 acres of undeveloped 
ground located in Murray, Utah. (Ex. P-40) A portion of the 
property was originally owned by Mr. Parker's parents and other 
portions were owned by other individuals including some relatives 
of Mr. Parker who had no association or dealings with him. (TR-
127-130; 655) These parties had first sold the property to a 
developer who defaulted under the original purchase agreement. 
At the time of the first sale, the sellers had been asked to 
subordinate their interests to those of the lender. Mrs. Parker 
had advised Mr. Parker's parents and relatives not to do so. (TR-
84) By so doing, they were able to maintain a first position in 
the property and subsequently foreclose on and retain it. (TR-
848) [A fellow seller did not subordinate and consequently lost 
his interest in the property to the original lender. (TR-848)] 
Following its foreclosure, Mrs. Parker and a business 
associate, Mr. Martin Merrill, approached the original sellers 
about the sale of the property to them. (TR-317) A limited 
liability company was formed and an Agreement to Purchase was 
9 
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signed (Ex. P-62, P-63) by Mrs. Parker and Mr. Merrill. Mr. 
Parker did not want to be involved in the development process or 
the limited liability company. (TR-89) Rather, in keeping with 
his prior practices, he was interested in acquiring lots in the 
development on which to build homes, once the project was 
subdivided and approved. (TR-91) 
The property was purchased in August 1995, approximately two 
months before the parties separated. Following its purchase, Mrs. 
Parker expended substantial time, effort and money in beginning 
the process of securing the necessary government approvals to 
subdivide. (TR-91) Mr. Parker did nothing and contributed no 
monies towards this project. (TR-91) 
As of the date of trial, almost 2 years after the divorce had 
been filed, the subdivision was still in the planning process and 
had not been approved. (TR-323, 342) At trial, Mrs. Parker 
introduced Ex. P-59 which reflected all of the work she had put 
into attempting to subdivide this property. (TR-531) She also 
introduced Ex. P-64 which reflected all of the expenses which had 
been incurred and paid or were still owed on the project. All of 
these expenses had been paid with Mrs. Parker's earnings from her 
businesses. (TR-546) At the time of trial, this property was 
still raw land and had not been subdivided. (TR-533) 
Mr. Merrill testified that there had been significant 
engineering fees incurred to date (TR-322) and that there would 
be substantial future development costs in order to secure the 
necessary approval and complete the subdivision. (TR-323) He went 
10 
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on to say that the limited liability company was having access 
problems with the Murray City (TR-342) and that the present value 
of the land would not be the value of the land once the 
development was completed. (TR-344) He said he did not know what 
that value might be in the future, if and when the subdivision was 
completed. (TR-344) He said Mrs. Parker was the principal force 
in acquiring the property. (Tr-329) He went on to testify that 
Mr. Parker had done nothing on the project other than to sit in 
on a meeting with the* Parker family. (TR-359) He said Mrs. 
Parker put the deal together. (TR-360) He concluded his 
testimony by stating that Mr. Parker had filed a separate civil 
lawsuit against the limited liability company, Mrs. Parker and 
himself, seeking a 25% interest in the property. (TR-360, 362) 
That lawsuit was pending at the time this divorce case was tried. 
Mr. Parker admitted he had done little if anything in 
connection with the project. (TR-849, 852) He said Mrs. Parker 
and Mr. Merrill had done all of the development work to date. 
(TR-84 9) He said he had never done a subdivision development 
(TR-853) and that his wife and Mr. Merrill had put a lot of time 
and effort into the project. (TR-853) He admitted filing a civil 
lawsuit and a related lis pendens in connection with his claim 
that he should have an interest in the limited liability company 
and the project. (TR-868) 
He also acknowledged that his parents were able to retain 
their portion of the property because of Mrs. Parker's advice to 
11 
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them regarding not subordinating their interests at the time of 
the original sale. (TR-848) 
Finally, the only evidence before the trial court as to the 
value of the property as of the date the parties' marriage was 
terminated (i.e., April 15, 1996) was an appraisal performed by 
Mr. Jerry Webber. It was received into evidence by stipulation. 
(Ex.P-40) A copy of this exhibit has been included in the 
Addendum to this Brief. Mr. Webber concluded the property was 
worth $1,072,800. It had debt against it of $842,340 (Ex. P-41, 
included in the Addendum to this Brief). That resulted in a net 
equity of $230,460 of which Mr. and Mrs. Parker owned a one-half 
interest of $115,23 0. Mr. Parker presented no evidence as to what 
the value of this property was either as of April 15, 1996 or the 
date of trial. He testified, over objection, as to what he 
thought the future value of this property would be (TR-771) and 
stated he wanted to receive a 25% interest in the property because 
of the future profits he speculated could be realized when the 
development was completed. (TR-774) Mr. Parker failed to present 
any expert testimony as to what the value of this property was at 
any point in time. 
Bank Accounts 
It was undisputed that throughout the marriage the parties 
maintained their own separate bank accounts into which they 
deposited their own earnings/income (TR-408, 603, 674) Each then 
transferred monies from those separate business accounts into a 
12 
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joint account from which various family expenses were paid and 
also into a vehicle leasing account from which their automobile 
expenses were made. (TR-182, 670) Mr. Parker is incorrect in his 
statement regarding what evidence was before the trial court in 
connection with the parties' bank accounts. Mrs. Parker presented 
testimony and documentary evidence as to the balances in the 
parties' bank accounts as of April 15, 1996. (TR-530 and Ex. P-4A; 
P-60), both of which have been included in the Addendum to this 
Brief). Both parties testified that they each had business and 
personal expenses which were paid from their respective business 
accounts between the date they separated and April 15, 1996. (TR-
83 8) Neither party provided any detailed accounting as to those 
expenses. Also, Mr. Parker took the position that any profits he 
made on lots he sold after separation should be his alone. (TR-
838) 
Mr. Parker called Mr. Robert Miller in an attempt to trace 
monies each party had received and spent during this period. Mr. 
Miller testified that both parties had large sums of money going 
into and out of their accounts. (TR-561) (This was in large part 
due to the nature of each parties' respective business) . He said 
that there had been multiple transfers from account to account. 
(TR-628) In direct examination, he said that in his review he 
could not locate $62,991.91.00. (TR-567) On cross examination 
he admitted he had included a $16,000.00 deposit made by Mrs. 
Parker after April 15, 1996, (TR-629) but had not considered any 
deposits made by Mr. Parker after that date. (TR-642) Mrs. 
13 
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Parker testified she had used the $16,000.00 to pay income taxes 
which were due. (TR-646) Further, Mr. Miller admitted that he had 
not taken into consideration any outstanding business or personal 
account payables in connection with determining what the net 
amount of the bank account balances were as of April 15, 1996, 
(TR-63) and admitted that any such expenses should have been 
backed out to arrive at a more accurate figure as to what monies 
each party had as of April 15, 1996. (TR-643) He also admitted 
that the funds he claimed were unaccounted for could have been 
used for family living expenses between the date the parties 
separated and April 15, 1996, the date the parties' marriage was 
terminated. (TR-635) He said he had added the funds he said were 
unaccounted for to Mrs. Parker's side of the ledger simply because 
he could not find them. (TR-636) 
Finally, both sides presented evidence on the bank account 
balances that existed as of April 15, 1996. (See Ex. P-4A and D-
10) Mr. Parker's claim that only he presented evidence on this 
issue is incorrect. 
Mr. Parker has omitted the above testimony and evidence from 
his Statement of Facts and in so doing has not provided this Court 
with all of the background necessary to understand how the parties 
handled their finances and assets during their marriage, as well 
as facts very pertinent to the Murray Parkway property and the 
numerous bank accounts in issue. 
14 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A trial court is given broad discretion in fashioning 
property distributions in divorce actions. Appellate courts are 
reluctant to second guess a trial court's decision in divorce 
actions because the trial court is in the advantaged position of 
having actually heard the testimony of the parties and their 
witnesses and observed their demeanor. When a trial court's 
decision is appealed,the burden is on the party appealing to 
demonstrate that the trial court in some way abused that 
substantial discretion afforded it in valuing, dividing and 
distributing the assets of the parties. In that regard, the 
evidence presented at trial is viewed in favor of the non-
appealing party and the Appellant is charged with the 
responsibility of marshalling the evidence which supports the 
trial court's decision and then demonstrating that that evidence, 
when compared with the evidence presented by the Appellant, is 
insufficient to support the trial court's decision. Mr. Parker 
has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in 
how it valued and distributed the marital estate. He likewise has 
failed in his duty to properly marshall the evidence in his 
attempt to challenge the propriety of the trial court's decision. 
POINT II 
Under Utah law, a trial court has the discretion to bifurcate 
any issues/issues in a particular case. A decision to bifurcate 
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will not be overturned on appeal unless it can be shown that the 
trial court in some way abused that discretion. In this case, 
given the nature and history of the parties' respective 
businesses/occupations and the desire of Mrs. Parker to get on 
with her life, there was more than an adequate and justifiable 
basis for the court to decide to bifurcate this case, grant a 
decree of divorce and terminate the parties' relationship as 
husband and wife. Mr. Parker has not shown that the trial court 
abused its discretion in this regard. 
POINT III 
Under Utah law, the date on which to value a marital estate 
in divorce actions is the date of the parties' divorce. It is as 
of this date that the parties' legal relationship as husband and 
wife ends. A decree of divorce was entered on April 15, 1996 and 
the trial court followed Utah law in determining that that was the 
appropriate date on which to value this marital estate. A trial 
court may select an alternative valuation date if there is good 
cause to do so. In this case, Mr. Parker wanted a future 
valuation date assigned to some assets (i.e. the Murray Parkway 
property) and a date of separation valuation date assigned to 
others, (i.e. the parties' bank accounts), based upon his claim 
that Mrs. Parker had improperly used or dissipated marital assets. 
The trial court did not find that to be the case. It correctly 
followed Utah law in determining that the proper date on which to 
value this marital estate was April 15, 1996 - the date the 
parties' marriage ended. 
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POINT IV 
Mr. Parker presented no evidence as to the value of the 
Murray Parkway property other than to claim he felt it would be 
worth a lot of money sometime in the future, after it had been 
developed and subdivided. The only credible evidence on the 
present value of this property was the appraisal of Mr. Jerry 
Webber, which was received into evidence pursuant to stipulation. 
Mr. Parker has failed in his claim that this item of property was 
improperly or incorrectly valued by the trial court. 
Mr. Parker's claim that this property should have been 
divided in kind between the parties is likewise without merit. 
It is the policy in Utah to avoid keeping couples in business 
relationships after a divorce occurs. The trial court correctly 
followed Utah law when it awarded Mrs. Parker this property and 
gave Mr. Parker assets to offset the value of his interest in the 
property as a result of the marriage relationship. 
POINT V 
Mr. Parker claimed throughout these proceedings that Mrs. 
Parker had dissipated marital assets. The trial court determined 
that not be the case. Both sides presented evidence as to what 
monies were in their respective bank accounts as of the date of 
the divorce. Both sides had outstanding business payables on 
which neither presented evidence. Both sides paid personal and 
business expenses from their respective accounts. Given the 
conflict in the evidence regarding the balances in these accounts, 
it was appropriate for the trial court to simply award each party 
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the monies in his/her accounts. Even if that distribution was 
unequal, it was within the prerogative of the trial court to do 
so as long as it felt that the distribution was equitable. Mr. 
Parker has not shown that the trial court abused the broad 
discretion afforded it in how it distributed these accounts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS THE TRIAL 
COURT HAS CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION 
CONCERNING P R O P E R T Y / D E B T 
DISTRIBUTIONS AND ITS DECISION WILL 
NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS IT IS 
CLEARLY UNJUST OR A CLEAR ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION 
In divorce actions a trial court is vested with considerable 
and broad discretion in fashioning fair and equitable remedies for 
the parties on the issues of property/debt distributions. Its 
decision will not be changed by the appellate court unless it can 
be demonstrated that the decision is clearly unjust or there was 
a clear abuse of discretion. Walters v. Walters, 812 P. 2d 64 (Utah 
App. 1991). Mr. Parker has failed to show either. 
In order to prevail on this appeal, Mr. Parker is required 
to show that the trial court, in making its distribution of 
property, misunderstood or misapplied the law, entered findings 
not supported by the evidence, or caused a serious inequity so as 
to constitute an abuse of discretion. English v. English, 565 
P.2d 409, 410 (Utah, 1977). As was clearly stated in Searle v. 
Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1974): 
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Although it is both the duty and the prerogative of 
this court in a case of equity to review the facts as 
well as the law, Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution 
of Utah, the trial judge has considerable latitude of 
discretion in adjusting the financial and property 
interests in a divorce case. The actions of the trial 
court are indulged with the presumption of validity, 
and the burden is on appellant to prove such a serious 
inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
(Footnote) There is no fixed formula for the division 
of property; Section 30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953 provides that 
when a decree of divorce is made the court may make 
such orders in relation to property as may be 
equitable. (footnote) Jd. at 700. 
In making a property distribution, the trial court may 
consider numerous factors in arriving at an equitable result. 
Among those are such things as the property each party brought 
into the marriage; the property acquired during the marriage and 
the efforts and contributions of each party in the acquisition of 
such property; gifts received during the marriage; and 
inheritances. Because of the foregoing, a property division need 
not be equal, but only equitable. See MacDonald v. MacDonald, 23 6 
P.2d 1066 (Utah 1951). 
Mr. Parker's burden is not an easy one and the record does 
not show in any way, an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
As was stated in Jackman v. Jackman, 696 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1985): 
We have long adhered to the view that an appellate 
court cannot remain a court of appeals and invite a 
review of every case decided by a lower court where its 
judgment fails to satisfy one or both parties to the 
litigation. Neither can we properly serve our appellate 
function if we modify the factual determination of a 
trial court whenever we take a differing view of the 
evidence. Because the trial court alone can assess the 
demeanor and relative credibility of the witnesses, it 
is charged with the fact finding function and is 
responsible for determining an equitable resolution of 
the matter based on those findings. We accord its 
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actions broad deference. On appeal, we review the 
findings of fact only to determine whether they are 
supported by substantial record evidence. And we will 
not disturb the conclusions drawn from these findings 
unless some clear abuse of discretion is shown. Id. At 
1192 (citations omitted). 
In addition, it appears that Mr. Parker is operating under 
a misconception as to what constitutes fact and what is evidence. 
Simply because he presented evidence to the court in support of 
his position, does not automatically require the court to treat 
that evidence as fact. *In this case, the record reflects that the 
trial court accepted evidence from both sides, weighed that 
evidence and then found facts upon which to fashion remedies fair 
and equitable to both sides. It is not an error for a trial court 
to discount or not even consider evidence offered by one side or 
the other. In fact, it is the trial court's duty to analyze 
conflicting evidence in the process of determining what the 
ultimate facts are. Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Utah, 
1995). 
Further it does not appear from Mr. Parker's Brief that he 
has challenged any particular findings of fact. Rather he seems 
to be dissatisfied with the overall remedy fashioned by the trial 
court, based upon the facts found and as supported by the evidence 
presented. Assuming only for the sake of argument that his Brief 
is challenging the factual findings of the trial court, Mr. Parker 
has the duty to marshall all of the evidence in support of the 
findings which he challenges and then demonstrate that, even 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the evidence is insufficient to support those findings. (See 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah App. 1989) and 
Scharf v. BMG Corp. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah, 1985). Mr. Parker 
has failed to meet this requirement. He fails to mention the 
evidence and testimony in support of Mrs. Parker's position on the 
Murray Parkway property and the balances in the parties' bank 
accounts. (See Mrs. Parker's Statement of Facts infra). On this 
basis alone Mr. Parker's appeal should be denied. 
The entire thrust*of Mr. Parker's appeal is that the trial 
court did not give him what he wanted. It is an attempt to simply 
reargue above what has already been argued below and as such 
should not be considered on appeal. (See Campbell v. Box Elder 
County, 962, P.2d 806 (Utah App. 1998). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED 
THE BROAD DISCRETION AFFORDED IT 
WHEN IT BIFURCATED THE PROCEEDINGS 
IN THIS MATTER 
The authority to bifurcate a proceeding and try individual 
issues separately is found in Rule 42(b) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which states: 
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of 
convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate 
trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or 
third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any 
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-
party claims, or issues. 
Id. 
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Mr. Parker correctly recognizes that a decision as to whether 
or not to bifurcate proceedings in a particular case is left to 
the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Trial court's "enjoy considerable discretion" in 
determining whether to bifurcate issues under Rule 42 
(citation) Olympus Hills Center Ltd. v. Smith's Food, 
889 P.2d 445, 462 (Utah App 1994) 
Given this discretion, it then becomes incumbent upon the 
trial court to look at the facts of the particular case before it 
and determine whether or not it would be appropriate and in the 
« 
interest of justice to bifurcate and resolve certain issues before 
the resolution of other issues. In divorce cases, that discretion 
should be even broader given the responsibility of the trial court 
to fashion a remedy which is fair to both parties and the need to 
bring some predictability to the parties' future lives as quickly 
as possible. 
Mrs. Parker is aware of no Utah cases dealing directly with 
bifurcation of the marital status from support, custody and 
property issues. However, other jurisdictions have concluded that 
such an approach is not only permissible but in some cases 
necessary to ensure that one party is not allowed to take 
advantage of the other party by simply using the legal 
relationship of husband and wife to gain an unfair advantage in 
a final property debt distribution. 
In Hull v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 352 P.2d 
161, (Cal. 1960) (en banc), the California Supreme Court observed 
that separating the termination of a marriage from controversies 
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over spousal support and division of marital property is not a new 
idea: 
Severance of a personal relationship which the law has 
found to be unworkable and, as a result, injurious to 
the public welfare is not dependent upon final 
settlement of property disputes. Society will be 
little concerned if the parties engage in property 
litigation of however long duration; it will be much 
concerned if two people are forced to remain legally 
bound to one another when this status can do nothing 
but engender additional bitterness and unhappiness. . 
. . Otherwise property disputes, real and specious, 
could continue for years, effectively preventing the 
legal establishment of any other relationship by either 
party. (Citations omitted.) Id. at 166 
See also In re Marriage of Hermsen, 27 Wash. App. 318, 617 
P.2d 462, 465 (1980) (bifurcation promotes legislative "intent to 
provide prompt dissolution of unworkable marriages without regard 
to fault or a period of separation"). Relying on Hull, the 
California Court of Appeals held in Gionis v. The Superior Court 
of Orange County, 202 Ca.App. 3d 786, 248 Cal.Rptr. 741 (1988), 
that the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to 
bifurcate the issue of the marital status from all other issues. 
In observing that the husband's declaration contained sufficient 
reasons supporting his Motion to Bifurcate, the Court stated: 
Consistent with the legislative policy favoring no 
fault dissolution of marriage, only slight evidence is 
necessary to obtain bifurcation and resolution of 
marital status. On the other hand, the spouse opposing 
bifurcation must present compelling reasons for denial. 
Id. at 790. 
Financial and social restraints imposed by the enforced 
continuation of an irretrievable relationship should compel 
bifurcation when a party requests such relief. Constraint on 
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"financial or social endeavors" formed the basis of the husband's 
declaration in support of bifurcation in Gionis, supra. The 
husband's declaration in Gionis stated in part: 
I do not want the status of my marriage to effect [sic] 
my investments I wish to make. As examples, I should 
not be required to seek a quitclaim deed from [wife] if 
I decide to invest in real property or other business 
ventures, nor should I be required to obtain [wife's] 
consent to make application for and sign any loan 
documents regarding my finances. I should not have to 
run the risk that any business deals I decide to make 
are construed to be a community property because 
community credit rather than my own separate credit was 
utilized. . . . Id. at 789. 
The court held that the husband's declaration contained sufficient 
reasons supporting his motion to bifurcate. Id. at 790. It also 
held that he was not required to make a compelling showing of 
need, Id. at 788, as the trial court had required. Rather, it 
required the wife to demonstrate why bifurcation should not be 
granted. 
Like California, in 1987 the Utah legislature amended its 
divorce statute and eliminated fault as a basis for terminating 
a marriage and determined that a marriage could be ended simply 
because the parties had experienced irreconcilable differences. 
(See §30-3-1, et. seq. Utah Code Ann. ) . With the concept of fault 
gone and the fact that neither party was requesting alimony from 
the other, the trial court correctly concluded that there was no 
justifiable reason for the continuation of the legal relationship 
of Mr. and Mrs. Parker as husband and wife. 
In deciding whether or not to bifurcate in the Parker case, 
the trial court was faced with the following considerations: 
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1) Throughout the marriage, the parties had kept 
their respective businesses separate. 
2) At the time of separation each party was 
continuing to operate his/her own business. 
Mr. Parker was buying and selling lots and 
building and selling homes. Mrs. Parker was 
selling and developing real estate. She was 
taking new listings, earning commissions and 
expending substantial time and effort in 
attempting to develop the Murray Parkway 
property, a project in its infant stages. 
3) The marriage was over and there was no chance 
of reconciliation. 
4) Neither side was requesting alimony from the 
other. 
5) Mrs. Parker (and most likely Mr. Parker) 
wanted to get on with her life. 
With these facts before it, both the domestic relations 
commissioner and the trial judge came to the following correct 
conclusion. It is better to terminate this marriage so as to 
establish a date from which each party could pursue their own 
business and get on with their respective lives than it would be 
to continue the marriage and further complicate the financial 
issues with claims as to who might have earned or acquired what 
between the time of the parties' separation and the time the 
matter was ultimately tried. Also, in so doing, neither party 
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would then be allowed to sit back and do nothing, thereby being 
able to unfairly take advantage of the other's efforts to improve 
his/her financial situation. 
In bifurcating this case, the trial court did not value the 
marital estate nor did it make any distribution of the parties' 
assets and liabilities. It merely determined that under the facts 
of this case it was appropriate to terminate the parties' marriage 
and in so doing establish a date on which to value the estate. 
Mr. Parker claims *that he was prejudiced by the bifurcation. 
That is not so. There was no "de facto" distribution of the 
parties' assets as a result of bifurcation. That distribution was 
an issue reserved for trial. There was no valuation of the 
parties' assets. That also was an issue to be resolved at trial 
and each party had the opportunity to present evidence at trial 
as to what the value of each particular asset was as of April 15, 
1996 and more importantly to request that a particular asset be 
awarded to him or her. 
That is exactly what then happened at trial. Each party 
requested that he/she be awarded particular assets, and assigned 
values to those assets as of the date their marriage ended. It 
was at the time of trial that Judge Pueler made what she felt to 
be an equitable distribution of those assets and liabilities after 
she had listened to five days of testimony from the parties and 
their witnesses and received approximately 150 exhibits. 
Until the trial court made its final decision, neither party 
knew what assets he/she would receive. What each did know was 
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that each was required to disclose all assets he/she had as of 
April 15, 1996 and that if either had used marital assets to 
acquire separate property after April 15, 1996, that would have 
to be accounted for in the final property/debt distribution. 
Mr. Parker claims he was prejudiced by the order of 
bifurcation. Clearly that is not the case. Rather, it was Mrs. 
Parker who would have been prejudiced because, as a practical 
matter, she would have been prevented from doing anything other 
than trying to maintain* the "status quo" while waiting for a trial 
date. She would have been prevented from increasing the value of 
her real estate business. She certainly would have been reluctant 
to acquire more assets as a result of her earnings because of the 
very just fear that Mr. Parker would be able to sit back, wait and 
possibly delay the action for the sole purpose of being able to 
share in what she was acquiring after their marriage was legally 
over. 
So in order to avoid prejudice to either party, the domestic 
relations commissioner and the trial court both felt that the 
fairer approach would be to terminate the parties' marriage. In 
that way, a definite valuation date could be established to use 
in dividing up what the parties had acquired to that point in time 
and to allow each party to get on with their own respective 
financial lives. 
Mr. Parker's claim that the trial court abused the broad 
discretion afforded it in deciding whether or not to bifurcate 
this case is without merit. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT FOLLOWED UTAH LAW 
IN DETERMINING THAT THE DATE THE 
PARTIES' MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP 
ENDED WAS THE APPROPRIATE DATE ON 
WHICH TO VALUE THE MARITAL ESTATE 
Mr. Parker claims that the trial court abused the broad 
discretion he admits it has, in deciding that the proper date to 
value this marital estate was the date on which the parties' 
marriage relationship ended. His claim is without merit. 
Mr. Parker is correct in his statement that the general rule 
in Utah is that the marital estate should be valued at the time 
a Decree of Divorce is entered. 
The marital estate is evaluated 
according to the existing property interest 
at the time the marriage is terminated by the 
decree of the court (footnote) Fletcher v. 
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980) 
[See also Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 
(Utah App. 1987) which allows the trial 
court to use an alternative date if a party 
has dissipated assets]. 
Consequently, in deciding that the proper time to value the 
marital estate was the date the parties' marriage ended, the 
domestic relations commissioner and the trial judge followed Utah 
law. 
Since there is some discretion afforded a trial court as to 
when to value a marital estate, the first question to be asked is 
"was there a good reason to select that date as opposed to some 
other date?" The first reason is that the date of the Decree was 
the date trial courts have been instructed to use by the Utah 
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appellate courts. The second reason was succinctly articulated 
by Commissioner Arnett when he first considered Mrs. Parker's 
request to bifurcate: 
I think where this case really lies is that the Court 
has to take judicial notice of the fact that there is 
a booming real estate market in this valley, its 
credible that the Plaintiff would not want to devote 
herself to a real estate business, work hard, and then 
have to share the rewards of her work with the 
Defendant, where the parties are no longer together and 
there is no basis other than a legal fiction that they 
should share in their continuing labors. For these 
reasons, I am going to recommend that the Motion to 
Bifurcate is granted. (R-353) 
Judge Pueler had the benefit of that logic when she was asked 
to review Commissioner Arnett's recommendation. She likewise 
concluded that the logic was sound and stated: 
. . . The Court finds that pursuant to Rule 42 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure it is for the convenience 
of the parties to grant bifurcation and Defendant is 
not prejudiced in any way in this matter since all the 
assets accumulated by the parties prior to the granting 
of the Divorce will need to be disclosed . . . (R-119-
120) 
By making this decision the trial court in no way made any 
distribution of the assets in question as argued by Mr. Parker. 
Rather it selected a point in time consistent with the general 
rule in Utah to determine what comprised the marital estate and 
what the estate was worth at that particular point in time. 
By taking this approach neither party was prejudiced. Rather 
each knew what assets and liabilities were in existence at that 
point in time and each could then argue as to what assets each 
desired to be awarded. 
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Also, and of greater importance, the setting of the valuation 
date as the date the parties' marriage relationship ended, 
provided each party with peace of mind and some certainty that 
either could make new property acquisitions, enter into new 
business relationships and expend time and effort in their 
respective businesses that then could not be taken advantage of 
by the other party simply based upon the claim that they were 
married to one another. 
Contrary to all of*Mr. Parker's arguments, this was the fair 
way to ensure that one party was not allowed to simply sit back 
and then at some unknown future point in time take advantage of 
the hard work, time and effort which had been expended by the 
other in furthering and bettering his/her financial position. 
Almost VA years after the decision to bifurcate was made and 
only two weeks before trial, Mr. Parker again argued that the 
valuation date of the marital estate should be the date of trial, 
not the date the parties' marriage was terminated. Judge Pueler 
once again, for the second time, considered what would be the most 
appropriate and fair date on which to value the marital estate. 
Once again, her judgment remained the same. She again listened 
to Mr. Parker's unfounded claims of Mrs. Parker's hiding and 
dissipating assets and concluded that the proper date on which to 
value this particular marital estate was the date on which the 
parties' marriage ended. However, in her Order she went on to 
state that: 
2) The court finds that there will be two exceptions 
to the date of valuation. The first exception is that 
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either party has used a marital asset to increase the 
value of a post-marital asset, then that asset's value 
at the date of trial may be considered. Further, an 
exception will be granted if either party has hidden an 
asset or hidden the value of a property, 
3) The court specifically finds that the legal 
relationship of the parties ended at the date of the 
decree and that is the appropriate date of valuation. 
(TR-724-725 Order drafted by Mr. Parker's counsel) 
So, going into trial, each side had the right and opportunity 
to demonstrate that the other side had used marital assets to 
acquire non-marital assets or that the other side had hidden or 
* 
not disclosed assets. At trial, both sides gave it "their best 
shot" to demonstrate that the other had hidden or used marital 
assets to acquire or maintain non-marital assets. Neither side 
convinced the trial court that that had occurred. In fact, the 
trial court's findings are noticeably and properly silent 
regarding those claims simply because the evidence demonstrated 
that such activities did not occur. Because neither side 
demonstrated that there were circumstances to justify deviation 
from the general rule regarding valuation dates, the trial court 
was most correct in using the date the parties' legal relationship 
as husband and wife terminated as the date to value the marital 
estate. 
Parenthetically, it is important for this Court to note that 
at no time during the proceedings below did Mr. Parker present or 
offer to present any evidence whatsoever as to the value of the 
parties' assets as of the date of trial. One would think that if 
he felt so strongly about this issue he would have at least 
attempted to present evidence by way of proffer, as to the value 
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of the properties in question as of the date of trial. He failed 
in all respects to do so. Mr. Parker's claims of error on the 
issue of valuation dates are without merit. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN CONNECTION WITH THE MANNER IT 
VALUED AND DISTRIBUTED THE MURRAY 
PARKWAY PROPERTY 
Mr. Parker's argument regarding how the trial court valued 
and distributed the Murray Parkway property can be summarized as 
follows: 
1) Because the property had future development 
potential, the trial court should not have 
assigned a present value to it; and 
2.) Because there was the potential that the property 
could be worth more at some time in the future, 
the trial court should have awarded the property 
to both parties in equal shares. 
The questions before the trial court on the Murray Parkway 
property issue were likewise two-fold: 
1) Was there sufficient evidence to allow the trial 
court to value this property as it did?; and 
2) Based upon the evidence presented, was the trial 
court obligated to award the parties equal (in 
kind) interests in this property? 
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Based upon the broad discretion afforded trial courts in 
fashioning remedies in divorce actions, the answer to the first 
question is "yes" and the answer to the second question is "no." 
A. Valuation. 
The only evidence presented to the trial court on the value 
of this property as of April 15, 1996 was the appraisal performed 
by Jerry Webber. [Ex. P-40; admitted by stipulation (TR-25); a 
copy has been included in the Addendum to this Brief.] Mr. Parker 
presented no evidence as to what this property was worth as of 
April 15, 1996; or as of the date of trial. His only evidence as 
to value consisted of what he thought the property might be worth 
at some unknown point of time in the future after the work and 
expenses related to its future development had been completed and 
paid. (TR-770-774) 
Trial courts in Utah are not required to accept speculative 
testimony as to the value of a particular piece of property in 
divorce actions. As was stated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221 (Utah 1987), 
. . therefore, we do not think the trial 
courts refusal to speculate about 
hypothetical future consequences [valuation 
of a pension plan] was an abuse of 
discretion. Id. at 224 [Bracket language 
added] 
See also Morgan v. Morgan, 765 P.2d 684, 689 
(Utah App. 1990) 
The evidence presented by Mr. Parker consisted only of 
speculative statements that the property might be worth much more 
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at some time in the future after it had been developed, subdivided 
and readied for sale - something that had not happened as of 
April 15, 1996, or even as of the date this matter was tried. 
On the other hand, Mrs. Parker presented solid, unchallenged, 
expert testimony as to what this property was actually worth on 
the date the parties' marriage ended. It was not speculative, it 
was not hypothetical. Rather, it was credible and unchallenged. 
The trial court's decision as to the value of this property 
was supported by credible and undisputed evidence. Mr. Parker has 
shown no error in how the trial court valued this. 
B. Distribution. 
Mr. Parker's claim that the trial court should have 
distributed the Murray Parkway project in equal shares to he and 
Mrs. Parker is likewise without merit. That claim flies in the 
face of the following: 
1) Throughout the marriage the parties had kept their 
respective businesses separate. (TR-19, 20, 179, 
603, 674) 
2) Mrs. Parker was involved in real estate sales and 
development. (TR-17) Mr. Parker owned and 
operated a construction company. (TR-658) 
3) Mrs. Parker acquired an interest in the property 
through her real estate company. (TR-84) 
4) Mr. Parker did not want to be involved in the 
limited liability company which was developing the 
property. (TR-89, 90, 91, 320) He did not do any 
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work on the subdivision (TR-91) or contribute any 
monies towards it. (TR-320, 533) 
5) Mrs. Parker had expended trial time effort and 
monies in attempting to secure the necessary 
approvals in order to develop the property, a 
substantial portion of which occurred after April 
15, 1996, the date the Decree was entered. (TR-
514, 849, 853, Ex. P-59) 
6) There would have to be substantial additional fees 
and costs incurred in order to secure the 
necessary approvals in order to subdivide and 
construct improvements such as roads, sewer and 
utilities on the property. (TR-536, Ex. P-64) 
7) Mr. Parker had no experience in developing 
subdivisions. (TR-853) Mrs. Parker had 
substantial experience. (TR-471) 
8) Mrs. Parker wanted all financial ties with her 
husband terminated. (TR-521) 
9) There was substantial animosity between the 
parties. 
10) Mr. Parker had filed a separate lawsuit and a lis 
pendens against Mrs. Parker and her partner Mr. 
Merrill over ownership of the property. (TR-360) 
11) There was credible undisputed evidence presented 
at trial as to what the property was worth on or 
about April 15, 1996. (Ex. P-40 
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After considering all of the above, the trial court again 
exercised its broad discretion and made the following finding: 
21. Murray Parkway. The Murray Parkway Associates 
property should be awarded to Petitioner. The 
testimony of both parties established that while 
Petitioner has played a primary role in developing 
other properties, Respondent has no similar experience. 
Petitioner has been the person, as between these two 
parties, who has carried out the responsibilities of 
planning, meeting with officials, paying creditors and 
property owners on this project. The Court received 
Petitioner's Exhibit 59, which represents the numerous 
correspondence with the property owners, the City and 
other individuals to substantiate Petitioner's 
substantial involvement with the development of Murray 
Parkway. The Court further finds that Petitioner 
assisted Respondent's parents in maintaining their 
property when it was foreclosed upon some years ago, 
when it was sold to a previous buyer. Petitioner also 
assisted the Parkers in the foreclosure in advising 
them not to subordinate their interests, as some of the 
other property owners had, who eventually lost their 
properties. Given the animosity between the parties, 
Respondent's request that he become involved in the 
project with Petitioner is not feasible. The Court 
further finds that Respondent has filed a lawsuit 
against Petitioner, entitled Dale S. Parker v. Murray 
Parkway Associates, a Utah Limited Liability Company, 
Carla K. Parker, an individual, and Martin W. Merrily, 
an individual, Civil No. 970904981. In addition, 
although the property is a marital asset, it is 
impossible to project future value. The risk of profit 
or loss will remain with the Petitioner and the value 
of the property should be divided as of the divorce 
Decree. The value of Murray Parkway therefore, is the 
sum of $115,230.00, which is the present value. 
Respondent's one-half share, which should be credited 
to him, is the sum of $57,615.00. (R-830, 831) 
Once again, in awarding this property to Mrs. Parker, the 
trial court followed the general rule in Utah which was set forth 
in Arcryle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984) (quoting Savacre v. 
Savacre, 658, P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J. dissenting) : 
Wherever possible, this Court avoids division of 
marital stock between parties because it forces them to 
be in a close economic relationship which has every 
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potential for further contention, friction, and 
litigation, especially when third parties having 
nothing to do with the divorce will also necessarily be 
involved. Id. at 471. 
Likewise, in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) 
the Utah Supreme Court indicated that it is better practice to 
determine the present value of an asset (in Woodward it was a 
pension plan) and then award one party that asset and the other 
party offsetting assets. In this case, the trial court followed 
the Woodward approach and took into consideration Justice Durahms 
caveat about keeping ex-spouses financially entangled. 
long-term and deferred sharing of financial 
interests are obviously susceptible to continued strife 
and hostility, circumstances which our Courts 
traditionally strive to avoid to the greatest extent 
possible . . . Id. at 433. 
Mr. Parker argues that the trial court should not have 
followed this rule and relies on Savage v. Savage, supra, and Lee 
v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987) in support of his position 
that he should have been awarded one-half of the parties' interest 
in the Murray Parkway property. That reliance is misplaced. 
Savage, supra is clearly distinguishable. In that certain 
case three qualified experts testified about the value of certain 
stock the parties owned in a closely held family corporation with 
three dramatically disparate values given to that stock. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that trial court "had virtually no feasible 
alternative to an in-kind division of the stock." Id. at 1203. 
In addition, the Savage court restressed the principle that "in 
kind" divisions of marital property should be avoided if at all 
possible. Id. at 1205. In the present case, the trial court had 
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a real present value to place on the property verified by an 
appraisal. 
Likewise in Lee, supra the claim of error dealt with the 
trial court's failure to value stock owned by the husband and then 
to award any portion of that stock to the wife. Lee is 
distinguishable from the present case because the trial court, in 
the case at bar, was able to place value on the Murray Parkway and 
then included that value in the final property debt distribution. 
Judge Pueler recognized the animosity between the parties. 
She recognized that a present value could be placed on the 
property. She recognized that the property was in the preliminary 
stages of development which would necessarily require the 
expenditure of additional time, effort and money by Mrs. Parker. 
She then did what she was supposed to do under Utah law. She 
placed a present value on the property, awarded it to Mrs. Parker 
and awarded Mr. Parker assets to offset the value of the property 
which Mrs. Parker received. 
Mr. Parker has not demonstrated that the trial court 
committed any error in how it valued and distributed the Murray 
Parkway property. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN CONNECTION WITH THE MANNER IN 
WHICH IT VALUED AND DISTRIBUTED THE 
PARTIES' BANK ACCOUNTS 
Mr. Parker claims in Points III and IV of his Brief that the 
trial court erred by not accepting his position that the parties' 
bank accounts should have been valued as of the date of the 
parties' separation (Point IV) and by not accepting his evidence 
as to the amount of monies in the various bank accounts that were 
subject to division (Point III). Both claims are without merit. 
Throughout the proceedings below, from the time this action 
was filed through a five day trial and through numerous post-trial 
motions, Mr. Parker claimed that Mrs. Parker had failed to 
disclose, hidden, misappropriated and dissipated assets. In spite 
of his repeated attempts to convince the trial court that this was 
the case, the evidence demonstrated otherwise. 
Mr. Parker's girlfriend and business associate, Tamara 
Torkelson, testified that Mr. Parker had a good reputation. (TR-
166) Mr. Kevin Gates, the president of Freedom Mortgage testified 
that he had had numerous business transactions with Mrs. Parker 
and he always found her to be an honest and trustworthy person. 
(TR-243) He also said that he had been required to fire Ms. 
Torkelson because she had lied to customers. (TR-242, 243) Mrs. 
Parker testified that she had fully and completely disclosed and 
accounted for her income and bank account balances (TR-526), and 
that if anyone had failed to disclose assets, it was Mr. Parker 
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[i.e., his bank account and business dealings with Ms. Torkelson 
(TR-465); his endorsing her name on checks without her permission 
(TR-60, 412); the value of the gold he owned (TR-505)]. 
This conflict in testimony necessarily made credibility an 
issue. It is well established that the issue of witness 
credibility is an issue left to the trial court and appellate 
courts will not attempt to "second guess" a trial court when it 
comes to determining who was more credible in the proceedings 
below (See Mostrancr v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573 cert, denied 878 P.2d 
1154 (Utah App. 1993); and Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 
1991)). 
In this case the trial court did not accept Mr. Parker's 
position that Mrs. Parker had dissipated assets (namely bank 
account balances) between the date the parties separated and the 
date of the Decree. If it were inclined to do so and thereby 
conclude that the date of separation would have been the date to 
value these accounts, it would have first had to make specific 
findings as to why the date of separation should be used as a 
valuation date as opposed to the date the Decree of Divorce was 
entered (gee Morgan v. Morgan, 765 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah App. 1990). 
In failing to make such a finding, the trial court refused 
to give credence to Mr. Parker's argument. Therefore, it 
necessarily follows that under Utah law, in the absence of 
circumstances justifying use of an alternative valuation date, the 
proper date to value a marital estate is the date the parties' 
marriage relationship terminated, i.e., the date of the Decree of 
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Divorce. (See Fletcher, supra.) That is the valuation date the 
trial court used and it committed no error in doing so. 
In Point III of his Brief, Mr. Parker argues that the trial 
court failed to divide the various bank accounts of the parties 
in accord with the way Mr. Parker wanted them divided. He also 
claims that there was no evidence to support the way the trial 
court divided these accounts. That is simply not so. 
First there was conflicting evidence as to what monies were 
in these accounts as of*April 15, 1996. Mrs. Parker testified as 
to the balances in these accounts as of that date in connection 
with her proposed Property Debt Distributions (Ex.P-4A). She 
also presented documentary evidence to support that testimony in 
the form of banks statements reflecting the balances (Ex. P-60) . 
Mr. Parker places great weight on the testimony of his 
accountant Mr. Miller. However, that testimony created more 
questions than answers. First, and of critical importance, Mr. 
Miller stated he had not factored any accounts payable of either 
party in arriving at his conclusion that there was approximately 
$35,251.00 more in Mrs. Parker's accounts than there was in Mr. 
Parker's accounts. It must be kept in mind that with the 
exception of one account, all of Mrs. Parker's other accounts were 
business accounts into which she deposited her earnings and 
commissions, and from which she paid the ongoing day-to-day 
expenses of her real estate company. Further, he had added a 
$16,000.00 deposit made by Mrs. Parker after April 15, 1996. (TR-
629) Mrs. Parker testified that that deposit was made to cover 
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income tax checks which had been written before April 15, 1996. 
(TR-890) Mr. Miller also acknowledged that he had not taken those 
tax liabilities into account in arriving at his conclusion that 
Mrs. Parker was receiving more monies than was Mr. Parker and that 
these monies could have been used to pay income taxes. (R-62 9; TR-
628) Mrs. Parker also testified that between separating and April 
15, 1996 she had used the monies in her accounts to pay business 
as well as family living expenses. (TR-464, 472, 473, 483, 526, 
53 9) Mr. Miller acknowledged that if those monies had been used 
for family living expenses they should have then been deducted 
from the amounts he claimed were unaccounted for. (TR 645) 
Finally, Mr. Miller acknowledged that the bank account balances 
reflected in Mrs. Parker's Exhibit P-60 agreed with what he found 
those balances to be with the exception of a $2,000.00 transfer 
(TR-627). 
Based upon this conflicting evidence, the trial court made 
the following specific findings about the parties' bank accounts: 
As to the parties' bank accounts, the Court finds as 
follows: the parties were separated for several months 
prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. During 
that time, each party operated his or her business, 
derived income therefrom, paid debts and supported him 
or herself. Both parties testified that some bank 
accounts were business accounts only, while others were 
used for both personal and business purposes. Both 
parties also testified that business expenses were paid 
from the accounts on an ongoing basis. In addition, 
petitioner testified that funds were frequently 
transferred from one account to another for both 
business and personal reasons. Both parties also 
testified that monies came into the bank accounts from 
various sources, including ordinary business income, 
returns on business investments, monies from loans, or 
monies from gross sales or commissions. 
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Monies were also paid out of the accounts for numerous 
purposes. Some funds were used for the personal 
support of each party; some were paid toward business 
expenses or debts; some were used to purchase real 
property which has been divided by this decision; and, 
some funds were used to pay marital debts. 
Some business and personal bank accounts were 
commingled, and both parties used business income for 
self support and payment of marital debts. There is no 
specific accounting of all of the bank accounts, 
however, either as to the source of deposits or nature 
of expenditures, that will allow the Court to 
accurately determine any net value of the accounts or 
to divide the same fairly. Therefore, the Court awards 
each account to the holder of the same, and makes no 
valuation for purposes of the marital estate. 
Minute Entry, p. 11 and 12 (R-665-666) 
In making this finding and related award, the trial court 
also took into consideration Mrs. Parker's position that in this 
case, an equal division of the property would not necessarily be 
an equitable division. There is no fixed formula for dividing 
property and debt in divorce actions. (See Naranio v. Naranio, 
751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1988). However, Utah trial courts are 
guided by the general instruction to allocate property in a manner 
which best serves the needs of the parties and thus permits them 
to pursue their separate lives. [{See Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 
133, 135 (Utah 1987) ] . 
Likewise, the trial court rejected Mr. Parker's position that 
Mrs. Parker had in some way misused or dissipated any monies in 
the various bank accounts at issue. In so doing, it implicitly 
determined that Mr. Miller's analysis as to the monies in these 
accounts was deficient and incomplete. The analysis did not 
consider current payables. It included a $16,000 deposit made by 
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Mrs. Parker after April 15, 1996, but did not contain any review 
of monies Mr. Parker may have deposited in his accounts after that 
date. Faced with this conflicting and confusing evidence, the 
trial court did the best job it could in resolving the bank 
account issue in a manner which was fair to both parties. As 
Judge Pueler so appropriately observed in her ruling regarding Mr. 
Parker's post trial motions 
. . . We did try this case for five days and 
I think that both sides had a complete and 
fair opportunity to present whatever evidence 
they wanted to present and I don't find a 
basis, reviewing the pleadings, to grant a 
new trial . . . R-1027 at p. 26; p. 99 
Addendum to this Brief. 
The remedy fashioned by the trial court in handling the bank 
accounts as it did, was the only way the issue could have been 
handled given the conflicting evidence presented by both parties. 
Mr. Parker has not shown that the trial court abused its 
discretion in how it handled the division and distribution of the 
parties' bank accounts. Points III and IV of his Brief are 
without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
In divorce cases, a trial court is charged with the 
responsibility of receiving, reviewing and analyzing evidence on 
financial matters and then fashioning a remedy which is fair to 
both parties and allows each to get on with their respective 
lives. That is exactly what the trial court did in this case. 
First, it properly exercised its discretion in bifurcating 
this case. It correctly recognized that this marriage was over 
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and consequently each party should be given the opportunity to get 
on with their respective financial lives without the fear that the 
other would be able to "capitalize" on the ambition, hard work, 
and financial progress of the other while waiting for that 
ultimate trial date. 
Second, it followed well established Utah law in determining 
that the date the parties' marriage was legally terminated was the 
appropriate date to value the entire marital estate. 
Third, it followed Utah law and acted within the broad 
discretion afforded it in the manner in which it valued and 
distributed the Murray Parkway property. Its decision on value 
was based on the only credible evidence presented at trial as to 
what this property was actually worth - the Webber appraisal (ExP-
40). Its decision to award the property to Mrs. Parker was 
correct in that to do otherwise would have placed the parties in 
an ongoing hostile business relationship and would have unfairly 
allowed Mr. Parker to take advantage of the work and effort Mrs. 
Parker had put into the property after April 15, 1996. 
Fourth, the trial court did the best job it could in placing 
a value on and dividing the various bank accounts of the parties. 
The evidence presented by the parties was extremely conflicting. 
In spite of this, the trial court did not find that either party 
had misappropriated or dissipated marital funds/assets. Rather, 
it found, in keeping with the way the parties had traditionally 
handled their bank accounts, that the fairest way to resolve this 
issue was to allow each party to simply retain the monies which 
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existed in these accounts as of April 15, 1996. (See ExP-4A and 
ExP-60 - Addendum to this Brief). 
Mrs. Parker would request this Court to affirm Judge Pueler's 
decision in all respects and award her all of the attorney's fees 
and costs she has been required to incur in having to respond to 
this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this o)l^ day of G>&CX _, 
1999. 
~ DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
(A^~ <£^<yvx^-v-a * 
Sharon Donovan 
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Third Judicial Di-Vic; 
APR 2 7 TO 
SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901) SALI UW£Cyu>i?v 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN By * ^ A j f i 3 ^ ^ 
Attorneys for Petitioner (^  i-^ -, -
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-21G7 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
O0o 
CARLA K. PARKER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
DALE S. PARKER, 
Respondent. 
o0o 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
numerous days in July, August and October, 1997, before the 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Judge of the above-entitled Court, 
Petitioner appearing in person and by and through her attorney, 
Sharon A. Donovan, and Respondent appearing in person and by and 
through his attorney, Kellie F. Williams, and the Court having 
heard testimony of the parties and of their witnesses, having heard 
oral arguments of counsel and having further reviewed the pleadings 
and exhibits filed in this matter, and having taken this matter 
under advisement and having issued a written Minute Entry now makes 
and enters the following: 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil No. 95 490 4494 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The above-entitled matter was bifurcated, with that 
Decree of Divorce having been entered by the Court on April 15, 
1996. 
2. The parties entered into a stipulation resolving numerous 
issues prior to the trial, outlined below. 
3. Custody. The parties stipulated that Petitioner should 
be awarded custody of the parties' minor child, to-wit: Bryan, age 
17, born on April 2, 1980, subject to reasonable rights of 
visitation on behalf of Respondent. 
4. Child Support. Child support should be paid in the sum 
of $322.00 per month until Bryan reaches the age of eighteen and 
graduates from high school in his expected year of graduation. The 
Court heard testimony concerning the minor child's tutoring costs. 
The Court finds there should be no Order requiring Respondent to 
pay one-half of the tutoring costs, unless he voluntarily wishes to 
assist his child. 
5. Health Insurance. The parties agree that they should 
each maintain health and accident insurance on behalf of Bryan and 
share equally the premium and non-covered medical and dental 
expenses for Bryan, until he reaches the age of eighteen and 
graduates from high school in his expected senior year. 
6. Life Insurance. The parties agree that each party should 
maintain life insurance policies on their lives in the sum of 
$50,000.00, with Bryan named as sole and exclusive beneficiary 
2 
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thereon, until he reaches the age of eighteen and graduates from 
high school in his expected senior year. 
7. Attorney's Fees. Each party should pay their own 
attorney's fees and Court costs incurred herein. 
8. Appraisal Costs. The Court previously ruled that all 
appraisal costs will be equalized between the parties. The Court 
heard testimony that Petitioner has incurred appraisal costs of 
$2,500.00, and Respondent has incurred appraisal costs of 
$1,975.00. These costs should be equalized and Respondent should 
pay to Petitioner the sum of $262.50. The parties further 
stipulated that while they did not necessarily stipulate to the 
values of the real properties, as set forth in the appraisals, all 
of the appraisals in this matter on the real properties could come 
in as evidence, without the necessity of appraisers testifying. 
9. Income Withholding. The parties agreed that good cause 
exists not to require immediate income withholding of Respondent's 
child support obligation. As long as Respondent remains timely in 
the payment of child support, it is in the child's best interests 
for child support to be paid directly to Petitioner. In the event 
Respondent becomes delinquent in payment of the child support, 
automatic income withholding should be implemented, pursuant to 
statute. 
10. Restoration of Maiden Name. Petitioner may be restored 
to her maiden name and known as "Carla Sue Kelly. However, 
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Petitioner may continue to use the name of Carla Parker in her 
business dealings. 
11. Furniture and Furnishings. The furniture and furnishings 
should be equitably divided by the Court, as outlined below in 
paragraph 24 (i), with Petitioner being awarded the painting from 
her sister and a reasonable amount of copies of the children's 
pictures. The parties stipulated that Petitioner has received the 
framed picture of her mother and dad. The parties agreed that 
Respondent should be awarded the parrot, "Shorty." Respondent 
shall be awarded his genealogy books and yearbook. 
12. Debts. Each party should be ordered to pay their own 
debts and obligations, including business obligations and hold the 
other harmless from any obligation thereon. 
13. Alimony. Both parties are capable of employment and no 
alimony should be awarded to either party. 
14. Restraining Order. There should be a mutual Restraining 
Order from harming, harassing or bothering the other or incurring 
any obligations against the other. 
15. The Court heard numerous testimony concerning the 
remaining contested issues of property division and other related 
issues. The Court further finds that during the course of the 
trial, the Respondent withdrew his Objection to the Protective 
Order and the Court finds that the Protective Order entered in this 
matter under Civil No. 954904494 shall be consolidated with this 
action and become a part of the final Order. 
4 
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16. Valuation of Marital Assets. The Court previously 
ordered that the date of the bifurcated divorce, April 15, 1996, is 
the date of valuation of the marital assets. 
17. Real Property. The Court finds that it is reasonable to 
divide the real property acquired by the parties in the following 
manner: 
(a) Petitioner' s Home. The home at 1772 Dove Hollow 
Circle, which was valued at $280,000 as of April 15, 1996, should 
be awarded to Petitioner, subject to the debt thereon. The 
mortgage balance as of the same date was the sum of $202,541.28. 
The equity, therefore, belonging to both parties as of that date is 
the sum of $77,459.00. One-half of equity is to be credited to 
Respondent. The promissory note (Petitioner's Exhibit 7) in the 
sum of $50,000.00 which was prepared by the Petitioner is not 
included as a debt against the home for purposes of division of 
marital property or debts. The evidence received during the course 
of the trial is that the Petitioner prepared it in favor of Kevin 
Gates, that Kevin Gates did not intend to ask her for the money 
unless he "needs" it at some point in the future, that Petitioner 
told Respondent she was given the lot by Gates, and that she did 
not have to pay her one-half share. Based upon all of that 
evidence, the Court finds that it is not a debt that Petitioner is 
obligated to pay, and the value of the home equity should not be 
reduced accordingly. 
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(b) Duplex. The duplex at 2214 W, Bonniebrook Drive is 
a marital asset, and is valued at $140,000.00, less a mortgage 
balance of $74,267.00. The duplex is awarded to Petitioner, 
subject to the debt. The parties' equity in the duplex is in the 
sum of $65,733.00; one-half of this is to be credited to 
Respondent. 
Petitioner has collected rental income from the duplex 
during the parties' separation. In addition, during that period, 
she has maintained the home and paid the mortgage payments on it, 
although the parties jointly cared for the duplex prior to their 
separation. Petitioner should be awarded the net proceeds from the 
duplex that she collected as rental income during the separation, 
without any contribution of those sums to Respondent, in part, 
because of the payments that she has made. In addition, any rental 
income that Petitioner received for this duplex will act as an 
offset to her claim against Respondent for the rental value of the 
residence that he occupied during that same period of separation. 
(c) Denver Street Property. The home located at 1070 
Denver Street is a marital asset in which the parties jointly have 
a one-half interest, together with their son. Respondent testified 
in connection with this home that he and Petitioner discussed the 
purchase as a residence for their sons while the sons attended 
college. Petitioner testified that she has depreciated that 
property on her income taxes every year, that she collects rental 
6 
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funds from her son, and that she further subsidizes the mortgage 
payment. Petitioner further testified that she and the parties' 
son are on the title to the home, as well as the loan. The 
parties, it appears, have treated the property as their property, 
including receiving the tax benefits of ownership. The Court 
finds, based upon that evidence, that the property is a marital 
asset to the extent of the parties' one-half interest. Although no 
appraisal was performed, Respondent's estimated value was the sum 
of $110,000.00 and no evidence to the contrary was received. Based 
upon the mortgage owed in the sum of $74,956.00, the parties 
jointly have $17,522.00 in equity. Petitioner should be awarded 
the parties' interest in that home, with each party awarded one-
half of the equity. Respondent should receive credit for his 
share. 
(d) Spokane Property. Lot 7, River Bluff Estates in 
Spokane, Washington, is marital property which, at the time of 
trial, was listed for sale. The Court ordered that the property 
continue to be listed for sale until sold, with Petitioner to be 
responsible for maintaining the current listing. Since the time of 
trial, the Washington lot has sold and the net proceeds of 
$83,914.97 were divided equally between the parties and from which 
proceeds Respondent had equalized the value of the marital assets 
as set forth in paragraph 26. Petitioner should file a 
Satisfaction of Judgment reflecting that the property settlement 
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has been paid. Petitioner testified that she exchanged Lot 9 for 
Lot 7, and that she does not own Lot 9 at this time. The Court 
finds that testimony to be credible and to be supported by 
documentary evidence produced at the time of trial. The Court, 
therefore, finds that no interest exists in the parties as to Lot 
9. 
(e) Marital Residence. The marital residence located at 
6305 South 1300 West, Murray, should be awarded to Respondent. The 
value of the home is $176,000.00 and no mortgage is owed thereon. 
Each party is awarded one-half of the equity in that home as of the 
date of the date of the divorce Decree in the sum of $88,000.00. 
Petitioner is to receive credit for her share. Although a 
Stipulation signed by the parties during early stages of this 
lawsuit required Respondent to pay $100,000.00 as Petitioner's 
share of equity, that sum was based upon both parties' erroneous 
assumption regarding the value of the home. The equity should be 
divided based upon the appraisal, which was stipulated to by both 
parties prior to the time of trial. 
Petitioner's claim for reimbursement of the rental value 
of the home during the period of separation is denied. Although it 
is clear that Respondent has had the use of a home on which no 
mortgage payments are owed, Petitioner received the value of rental 
payments on the parties' duplex as set forth above, which she did 
not share with Respondent. In addition, the financial resources of 
8 
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the parties are disparate. Based upon the 1996 tax returns 
(Petitioner's Exhibits 52 and 54), Petitioner has a greater ability 
to pay debts. The Court has considered their respective resources 
in addition to the rental income retained by Petitioner. 
(f) Lot Behind Marital Residence. The Court finds that 
the parties have no ownership interest in that property. 
Petitioner testified that title has always been held by 
Respondent's parents. Although both parties testified to some 
limited usage of the lot, it appears that it was with the 
acquiescence of Respondent's parents who own the lot. Leone 
Parker, Respondent's mother, testified that she and her husband, 
Respondent's father, own the property and has never intended to 
transfer it to these parties. Based upon the evidence as set forth 
above, the Court determines that there is no ownership interest in 
this lot held by either of the parties. 
(g) Boras Mountain View. Lot 105, Borgs Mountain View, 
is a marital asset, which is awarded to Respondent. The Court 
finds the value to be the sum of $40,000.00, based upon the sale 
price of a lot close to the one in question. The lot which sold 
for $40,000.00 is similar in size and is located on the same 
street. Each party is awarded one-half of the equity value of that 
lot. 
(h) Almost Heaven, Kamiah, Idaho Property. Lot 10, Almost 
Heaven, Kamiah, Idaho, is a marital asset, which is listed for 
9 
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sale. The parties jointly have a one-half interest in that 
property. It should continue to be actively marketed for sale 
until sold, with Respondent responsible to do so. At the time of 
sale, the net proceeds to which the parties are jointly entitled 
are to be divided equally between them. 
(i) Tahoe Ridge, Kooskia, Idaho Property. Tahoe Ridge, 
Kooskia, Idaho, is a marital asset in which the parties jointly 
have a one-half interest. The marital value of that property is 
$40,087.00 and that property is awarded to Respondent. Each party 
is awarded one-half of the equity, with Petitioner to receive 
appropriate credit. 
18. Disputed Real Property. Several of the parcels of 
property are in dispute. In connection with Respondent's business, 
the parties individually or jointly would obtain properties and 
Respondent would build homes. Petitioner would sell the homes and 
each party would receive income: Petitioner by way of commissions, 
and Respondent by way of profit, on the sale of the homes. Some 
parcels of real property were actually owned by the parties, and 
were inventory in Respondent's business. Others were titled in 
their names only to facilitate the construction loans, but the 
parties actually had no ownership interest. The title to those 
parcels was simply "passed through" for purposes of effectuating 
the sale to the ultimate purchaser. As to the properties in 
dispute, the following findings are made: 
10 
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(a) The properties owned by the parties located at 5520 
W. Suncliff Court; 5456 W. Banberry Court; and 5635 S, Capitol Reef 
Drive were properties that were sold prior to the time that the 
parties separated. Although Petitioner testified that she received 
no benefit from those funds, the Court finds that both parties, in 
fact, received benefits, either by way of debt payment or purchase 
of other assets which were divided by the ruling. Therefore, as to 
these properties sold prior to the parties' separation, no division 
of any proceeds is made. 
(b) As to properties located at 13227 South 2990 West and 
Lot 2, Dove Hollow# located at 1839 W. Dove Hollow, the Court finds 
that the parties had no ownership interest in the lots themselves. 
The parties never purchased or paid for these lots. Respondent's 
testimony, which is buttressed by the documents received in this 
case, was that the lots were in the parties' names because of the 
construction loan Respondent obtained. Neither of these lots, 
therefore, became marital property in which the parties had any 
interest. Therefore, there are no marital proceeds which are to be 
divided. 
(c) As to the Ravenwood Lot at 13070 South 2980 West and 
Lot 5, Dove Hollow, at 1802 W, Dove Hollow, the Court finds that 
there are no marital proceeds which should be divided. As to these 
two lots, although they were sold during the parties' separation, 
11 
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the funds from the lots were used in other properties which were 
owned as of the date of the divorce Decree. 
(d) As to property located at 13097 South 340 West, the 
property was acquired after the divorce Decree and no marital asset 
exists for purpose of division. 
(e) As to Lot 101, Shadow Mountain, at 5208 W, Case 
Mountain Road, the value of the marital asset as of the divorce 
Decree was the value of the lot in the sum of $34,900.00. 
Respondent has previously received any consideration paid thereon. 
Petitioner should be credited one-half of the value of the equity 
in this lot in the sum of $17,450.00. 
(f) As to the property at 6005 Dewdrops Drive, the value 
of the lot owned by the parties was $25,000.00, which was received 
by Respondent. The equity should be divided equally between the 
parties in the sum of $12,500.00. The profit derived from the 
building and sale of the home by Respondent's business and the 
commissions earned by Petitioner's business, are ordinary business 
income to each of them and should not be included in a division of 
marital assets. 
As to the two properties set forth above on Dewdrops 
Drive and Shadow Mountain, the parties or Respondent's business 
acquired them for the purpose of business inventory. The value of 
the real property is part of the value of Respondent's business, 
which the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to share. 
12 
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19. Parties1 Respective Businesses. The Court heard 
testimony concerning the parties' respective businesses acquired 
during the course of this marriage. Petitioner is a real estate 
broker and has ownership interests in R Brokers Partnership which 
represents Petitioner's one-sixth share in the building located at 
150 East Vine Street; one-sixth interest in Realty Broker's Service 
Corp. and an interest in the fixed assets and equipment of Realty 
Broker's performance. The Court further finds that Respondent has 
an interest in Aspen View Homes and has been a builder during the 
course of this marriage. 
As to the business interests of the parties, the Court finds 
that although each party operated his or her own business, the 
parties used their joint efforts to support the other's 
enterprises. Petitioner and Respondent both testified that they 
purchased real property in their joint names. Petitioner, as a 
realtor, would pre-sell a home, and Respondent, as a builder, would 
construct the home. Although they had separate business accounts, 
Petitioner testified that they frequently borrowed money from each 
other, and each had writing privileges on most of the other's 
accounts. The parties transferred funds into a joint bank account 
for purposes of paying marital bills, and the parties filed joint 
tax returns until the separation. Although Petitioner testified 
that Respondent never encouraged her or helped with her business, 
it appears based upon the above facts that the parties acted in 
concert with each other, provided mutual support, pooled financial 
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resources, made joint payments on marital debt, and received 
financial benefit from the interaction. Based upon that, each 
party should be awarded his or her own business, with the other 
party to receive credit for one-half of the value of that business. 
As to Petitioner, her business has the following values, which 
were stipulated to by the parties: the Realty Broker's performance 
equipment - $950.00; Realty Broker's Service Corporation equipment 
- $1,592.00; the building located at 150 East Vine Street -
$33,425.00; Petitioner's business value is the sum of $35,967.00 
and Respondent should receive credit for one half of that sum. 
As to Respondent, his business value is as follows: Aspen View 
Homes equipment - $3,375.00. Respondent's business also has value 
in the real property held as inventory at the time the parties were 
divorced, and the Petitioner is awarded one-half equity as set 
forth above. 
20. Bank Accounts. As to the parties' bank accounts, the 
Court finds as follows: The parties were separated for several 
months prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. During that 
time, each party operated his or her business, derived income 
therefrom, paid debts and supported him or herself. Both parties 
testified that some bank accounts were business accounts only, 
while others were used for both personal and business purposes. 
Both parties also testified that business expenses were paid from 
the accounts on an ongoing basis. In addition, Petitioner 
testified that funds were frequently transferred from one account 
14 
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to another for both business and personal reasons. Both parties 
also testified that monies came into the bank accounts from various 
sources, including ordinary business income, returns on business 
investments, monies from loans or monies from gross sales or 
commissions. 
Monies were also paid out of the accounts for numerous 
purposes. Some funds were used for the personal support of each 
party; some were paid toward business expenses or debts; some were 
used to purchase real property which has been divided by this 
decision; and some funds were used to pay marital debts. 
Some business and personal bank accounts were commingled, and 
both parties used business income for self support and payment of 
marital debts. There is no specific accounting of all of the bank 
accounts, however, either as to the source of deposits or nature of 
expenditures, that will allow the Court to accurately determine any 
net value of the accounts to divide the same fairly. Therefore, 
the Court awards each account to the holder of the same, and makes 
no valuation for purposes of the marital estate. 
An exception to that exists in the bond accounts in 
Petitioner's possession. She may receive a portion of those funds 
in the future. Respondent should be awarded one-half of the net 
funds that Petitioner receives at that time. These funds represent 
a return on the investment made by Petitioner's business during the 
time the parties were married, and should be divided accordingly. 
15 
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21. Murray Parkway. The Murray Parkway Associates property 
should be awarded to Petitioner. The testimony of both parties 
established that while Petitioner has played a primary role in 
developing other properties, Respondent has no similar experience. 
Petitioner has been the person, as between these two parties, who 
has carried out the responsibilities of planning, meeting with 
officials, paying creditors and property owners on this project. 
The Court received Petitioner's Exhibit 59, which represents the 
numerous correspondence with the property owners, the City and 
other individuals to substantiate Petitioner's substantial 
involvement with the development of Murray Parkway. The Court 
further finds that Petitioner assisted Respondent's parents in 
maintaining their property when it was foreclosed upon some years 
ago, when it was sold to a previous buyer. Petitioner also 
assisted the Parkers in the foreclosure in advising them not to 
subordinate their interests, as some of the other property owners 
had, who eventually lost their properties. Given the animosity 
between the parties, Respondent's request that he become involved 
in the project with Petitioner is not feasible. The Court further 
finds that Respondent has filed a lawsuit against Petitioner, 
entitled Dale S. Parker v. Murray Parkway Associates, a Utah 
Limited Liability Company, Carla K. Parker, an individual, and 
Martin W. Merrill, an individual, Civil No. 970904981. In 
addition, although the property is a marital asset, it is 
impossible to project future value. The risk of profit or loss 
16 
i/ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
will remain with the Petitioner and the value of the property 
should be divided as of the divorce Decree. The value of Murray 
Parkway therefore, is the sum of $115,230.00, which is the present 
value. Respondent's one-half share, which should be credited to 
him, is the sum of $57,615.00. 
-ite—addirtriuii,—-pursuant—fee—stipulation-;—Respondent yhuuifcd-
immediately release the Lis Pcndcno on the Murray Parkway property 
to onable PeLiLioner to continue to market the property. 
22. Vehicles. As to the vehicles, the Court finds as 
follows: 
(a) The 1995 Lexus and the 1994 Jeep have been sold by 
Petitioner. At the time of sale, Petitioner incurred no additional 
debt, nor did she receive any additional value for those vehicles. 
The marital estate value of both of them, therefore, is zero. 
(b) The 1990 F-250 truck has a marital value of 
$9,000.00, which is the amount Respondent charged the parties son 
to whom he sold the truck. Respondent should receive any payments 
from the parties' son, and Petitioner should receive credit for 
one-half of the value of the truck in the sum of $4,500.00. 
(c) The 1996 Ford truck should be awarded to Respondent. 
It was acquired after the divorce Decree, and no value is assessed, 
based upon stipulation of the parties. 
(d) The 1972 Ford truck should be awarded to Respondent. 
The value, based upon Respondent's testimony, is the sum of 
17 
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$1,000.00. Petitioner should receive credit for one-half of that 
value, in the sum of $500.00. 
(e) The 1985 Ford truck should be awarded to Respondent. 
The value, based upon Respondent's deposition testimony, is the sum 
of $4,500.00. Petitioner should receive credit for one-half of 
that value in the sum of $2,250.00. 
(f) The 1956 Ford truck is awarded to Respondent. The 
value, based upon Petitioner's testimony, is the sum of $1,000.00. 
Petitioner should receive credit for one-half of that value in the 
sum of $500.00. 
(g) The motor home, boat and hot tub should all be sold, 
and net proceeds divided equally. The party currently in 
possession of the particular asset should take steps to list and 
market the item for sale. 
(h) The tool trailer should be awarded to Respondent. 
Respondent testified that he paid $800.00 for it, and that it is a 
1977 single axle trailer. The Court finds the value to be $500.00, 
consistent with Respondent's testimony. One-half of that value, in 
the sum of $250.00, should be credited to Petitioner. 
23. Houseboat. The houseboat held in the name of Total 
Surprise, LLC, should be awarded equally to the parties, with each 
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24. Personal Property. The parties should be awarded other 
items of personal property, as follows: 
(a) Respondent should be awarded the guns and ammunition 
in his possession, which are valued in the total sum of $3,775.00, 
based upon Respondent's Exhibit 10. 
(b) Respondent should be awarded the gold and silver 
pieces in this possession which are valued at $23,380.00. Although 
Petitioner testified that she believed it had a higher value, there 
was no substantive evidence to corroborate her testimony. There 
was also no other evidenced to support Respondent's claim that 
Petitioner had kept some of his coins. Therefore, the gold and 
silver are valued as set forth on Respondent's Exhibit 10 in the 
sum as set forth above. 
(c) The tools and equipment in the garage, and 
compressors are awarded to Respondent and the value is set on those 
items in the sum of $3,000.00. The Court finds that both parties 
placed disparate values on the items they each received. The 
Respondent valued the tools at less than $2,000.00. The Petitioner 
valued the tools at $3,000.00, and the compressors at an additional 
sum. It appears that, taking both values into account, that a 
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(d) The camping equipment is to be divided equally 
between the parties. 
(e) As to the ski equipment, each party is awarded one 
set of skis, Respondent to be awarded the remainder of the ski 
equipment, which is valued in the sum of $400.00. The value is 
based upon an assessment of both parties' testimony as to their 
value. 
(f) As to the marine radios, each party is awarded one. 
(g) As to the Satellite dish and receivers, both items 
are to be sold and any amount of profits divided equally between 
the parties. The items are in the Respondent's possession and he 
is directed to seek a sale on them. 
(h) The Petitioner should be awarded the jewelry 
currently in her possession. The Court finds the total value in 
the sum of $7,150.00. A portion, $5,150.00 set forth in 
Petitioner's Exhibit 46, is based upon an appraisal done on four 
rings in her possession. Although the Respondent used a higher 
value, the Court finds as to these items, that it is appropriate to 
use this valuation, as opposed to the replacement value utilized by 
Respondent. The other $2,000.00 value, as set forth above, is 
miscellaneous jewelry itemized on Petitioner's Exhibit 4. 
(i) Each party is awarded the furniture and furnishings 
currently in his or her possession. The Court finds that each 
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testified that he or she had furniture of little value, while the 
other party had furniture of substantially greater value. The 
Court finds, based upon the itemized lists of furniture provided by 
each party, each party has furniture and furnishings that are of 
substantially the same value. Therefore, the Court finds that each 
has the same amount of property in terms of value. 
25. Tax Deduction. The Court finds, based upon the 
difference in the parties' respective incomes and the amount of 
child support, Petitioner should be awarded the child for purposes 
of the tax exemption. 
26. Overcharges. Petitioner claims that there were 
overcharges on her residence from Respondent's Other Projects, and 
that those were charged inappropriately to her home. Respondent 
testified and provided some documentary evidence otherwise. The 
Court finds that there is no evidence that Respondent made any 
inappropriate charges against Petitioner's home and, therefore, 
denies Petitioner's request. 
27. Life Insurance and Retirement Plans. As to life 
insurance and retirement plans, Respondent should be awarded the 
Jackson National Life Insurance policy, which has a cash value of 
$2,879.00. Respondent is also awarded the Surety Life Retirement 
Policy in the sum of $18,131.00. Petitioner is awarded the 
Prudential Securities SEP-IRA, which has a value of $63,706.00. 
28. Value of Marital Assets. Based upon the above, the total 
value of marital assets to be divided between the parties is 
21 
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$809,694.00. By this ruling, the Petitioner has received assets 
valued at $402,767.00, and Respondent has received assets valued at 
$406,927.00. The parties also have other assets which are to be 
divided equally after sale, as set forth above. Respondent is 
ordered to pay Petitioner the sum of $2,080.00 to equalize the 
asset division, which sum is to be paid from proceeds of the sale 
of one of those assets. 
29. 
30. Aristocrat Travel. The parties are each awarded one-half 
of any restitution which may be received in the future from the 
Aristocrat Travel cruise refund. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. An Order shall be entered herein based upon the ruling of 
the Court and stipulations of the parties concerning division of 
the property of the parties, payment of support, payment of the 
debts and obligations of the parties, and other matters, as more 
specifically set forth in the foregoing Findings of Fact, and the 
same should be ratified, approved and confirmed in all particulars. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That judgment be entered accordingly. 
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DATED t h i s ^ 7 day of UJXxl if , 1998 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
By 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
g?Lf-i. CC^v^C^-* rA £x SANDRA N. PEULER 
district Court Jud< 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the Q/i^ day of February, 1998, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Kellie F. Williams 
Attorney at Law 
Corporon & Williams 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake Cit/, Utah 84102 
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^ A l ^ S T A T E LEGAL SUPPLY CO 1 
PROPOSAL "B"--AMENDED 
PLAINTIFFS PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 10/22/97 
CARLA AND DALE PARKER 
DALE CARLA 
Real property 
^ouse at 1772 Dove Hollow Circle, SLC 
(Webber appraisal $280,000 less mortgages $252,541) $27,459 
22214 W. Bonnie Brook Dr. (Duplex) 
(Webber appraisal $140,000 less $74,267 mortgage) 65,733 
1070 Denver Street (son's home) 
3Lot 7 River Bluff Estates, Spokane, WA (Carla) 60,000 
4House at 6305 South 1300 West, Murray $176,000 
(Webber appraisal $176,000; owned clear) 
[See Partial Stipulation and Order re Home Equity] 
5Lot behind house 75,000 
6Lot 105 Borgs Mountain View 50,000 
Lot 10 Almost Heaven, Kamiah, ID (10 acres) 
(Stroble appraisal $29,300; owned clear 
—Dale has 1/2 interest) 14,650 
Tahoe Ridge, Kooskia, Idaho—83 acres (Dale) -
(Stroble appraisal $178,400 less debt $98,226 
as of 4/15/96 = equity $80,174 @ 1/2 interest) 40,087 
Real Properties sold by defendant on which 
plaintiff received no share of sales proceeds; 
Value shown as marital property is value of lot 
which parties owned clear. 
5520 West Sun C l i f f C o u r t , SLC (Soldio/i2/95-$94,4ii) 30 ,000 
5456 West B r a n b u r y C o u r t , SLC (sold8/9/95-497,936) 3 0 ,000 
5635 S. C a p i t o l Reef D r . , SLC (Sold7/20/95~$i22,793) 3 2 , 0 0 0 
1839 West Dove Hollow C i r . , SLC (sold 5/23/96~$7i,229> 4 6 , 0 0 0 
6005 S. Dewdrops D r . , SLC (Sold5/i4/96-$io2,i98) 3 0 , 0 0 0 
13227 So . 2990 West , R i v e r t o n (Sold2/26/96~$n,990) 4 8 , 0 0 0 
13078 So . 2980 West , R i v e r t o n (Sow2/20/96»$59,2io) 3 8 , 0 0 0 
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DALE CARLA 
1802 West Dove Hol low C i r . , SLC (Soid2/5/9<s-$74,i60) 6 8 , 9 0 0 
5208 W. Case Moun ta in Rd. , W.J . (sold ioy7/9<s-$8i,373) 3 5 , 0 0 0 
13097 Sou th 3040 West , R i v e r t o n (Sold 4/i/97-$75,485) 3 6 , 5 0 0 
Vehicles 
81995 Lexus LS400 (Carla) 
(Value $43,675 less debt $45,461 as of 3/31/96) 
91994 Jeep Grand Cherokee Ltd. (Carla) 
(Value $21,300 less loan $22,335) 
101996 Ford F-350 truck 32,000 
n1990 F250 4x4 truck (sold to son) 9,900 
121972 Ford F250 truck 1,000 
131985 Ford F250 truck 4,500 
141956 Ford Pickup truck 1,000 
l51978 Motorhome 4,500 
l61989 SeaRay 230 Cuddy Cabin boat 18,315 




l8Aspen View Homes 3 , 3 7 5 
[ 9 Real ty B r o k e r s P e r f o r m a n c e 
F i x e d a s s e t s / e q u i p m e n t 
-°Realty B r o k e r s S e r v i c e Corp . 
F i x e d assets/equipment—carta 's i/6 share of $9,554 
llR Brokers Partnership 
Building 150 E. Vine—Webber appraisal $258,000 less 
mortgage $57,450 = $200,550 @ 1/6 share 
Murray Park Associates 
(Webber appraisal $1,072,800 less debt $842,340 
= equity $230,460; Caria's 50% interest 
-
2Total Surprise LLC 
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DALE CARLA 
Life Insurance 
23Jackson National Life (Cash value $2,879) 2,879 
Retirement Plans 
S u r e t y L i f e SEP (stmt4/24/96) 1 8 , 1 3 1 
P r u d e n t i a l S e c u r i t i e s SEP (stmt3/31/96) 63 ,706 
Bank Accounts 
Cyprus CU #74823 (Parker Enterprises) 
Share account (3/3i/96-$3o.3i) 30 
Sharedraft checking (3/3i/96-$59.42) 59 
Cyprus CU #6591 (joint checking) ? 
Cyprus CU 50830, (Carla savings) 
Share account (4/8/96-$3,829.98) 3,830 
Cyprus CU #96770 (Dale, checking) (4/15/96) 
Share account (4/i5/96~$5o.27) 50 
Sharedraft checking (4/i5/96~$n,446.91) 11,447 
Cyprus CU #57172 (Aspen View Homes) 
Share account (4/is/96~$5i.26) ' 51 
Sharedraft checking (4/i5/96-$237.20) _ 237 
Zions Bank #17370586, Carla checking (4/12/96$99.80) 100 
First Interstate #21042197 
(Realty Brokers Performance) (4/i5/96-$io,o89.84) 10,090 
Key Bank #440690002777 ( S u n r i s e F l a t s ) (3/31/96 $75o.i9-noactivity April) 750 
F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e Bank #21186416 (Dove Hollow) (4/i/96~$6289.74) 6 ,290 
Miscellaneous 
Guns (Gallenson appraisal) 2,555 
Additional guns, ammunition and reloading equipment 
not produced for appraisal (see photographs) ? 
24Gold 50 ,000 
2 5 S i l v e r 10 ,000 
*\r 
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DALE CARLA 
26Jewelry (excluding gifts and wedding ring) $2,750 
^Yard tools and equipment in garage 3,000 
^Compressors, ski equipment, camp equipment 2,000 
(CarU would like one-half of camping equipment and coolers) 
Marine radios (2)—one to each 300 3 00 
Hot tub 6,000 
Satellite dish and receivers 2,400 
Furniture and furnishings left in home when 
parties separated—see list 18,000 
Living room, dining room and family room 
furniture taken by Carla (duplicates same left 
with Dale) 2,000 
29Rent value of living in marital residence 
since separation—21 months @$1,000 21,000 
^Overcharges against plaintiff's Dove Hollow 
residence from defendant's other projects 
charged to plaintiff's construction loan 
Aristocrat Travel Cruise Restitution— 
if and when received, to be divided equally 
TOTAL VALUES 
Property settlement from defendant to 
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Explanatory notes: 
1. First mortgage $2 02,541 as of 4/96 plus Kevin Gates1 note 
$50,000. 
2. Mortgage balance as of 4/96. 
3. Carla's estimate of value. 
4. Value at $225,000 is Carla's estimate of value. 
5. Carla's estimate of value. 
6. Carla's estimate of value based on comparable sales; owned 
clear. 
7. Int. Ans. 10. According to deposition p. 2 6-27 all vehicles 
are owned free and clear and are titled in his individual 
name, not in Aspen View Homes. 
8. Value is NADA Average trade-in value as of 4/96 when parties 
divorced; loan is balance as of 3/31/96. 
9. Value is NADA Average trade-in value as of 4/96 when parties 
were divorced; loan is also as of 4/96. 
10. Deposition p. 24. 
11. Value from Int. Ans. Deposition p. 24 says sold truck to 
son and has not received any money for it. 
12. Deposition p. 24. Sold truck to guy across the street for 
$1,000. 
13. Deposition p. 25. 
14. Value is Carla's estimate. 
15. Carla's estimate of value. 
16. Value is per Duce Marine quote. 
17. Carla's estimate of value based on comparables in newspaper. 
18. Defendant's Financial Declaration values equipment at 
$3,375. 
19. Value of fixed assets from Personal Property Affidavit filed 
with Salt Lake County Assessor. 
20. Equipment per Personal Property Affidavit filed with County. 
21. Mortgage balance as of 4/96. 
22. Carla's estimate of value. Parties own two 1/6 shares. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23. Int. Ans. 11. 
24. Plaintiff's estimate. Defendant has told other people he 
has anywhere from $25,000 to $200,000 in gold. 
25. Plaintiff's estimate of value. 
26. Philip &. Co. jewelry appraisal excluding value of wedding 
ring (#4 on appraisal). 
27. Plaintiff's estimate of value. 
28. Plaintiff's estimate of value. 
29. See letter from Verlinda Roberts stating rental value of 
home at $1995 per month. 
30. See written statement of Travis Parker. 
on 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JERRY R. WEBBER, MAI 
REAL ESTATE APPRAISER and CONSULTANT 
June 10, 1996 
Carla K. Parker 
1772 West Dove Hollow 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Dear Ms. Parker: 
In accordance with your recent request, I submit the following appraisal report on the 
property known as Murray Parkway subdivision, located at about 6200 South 1200 West, Murray 
City, Utah. The property is comprised of land containing a total of 33.52487 acres. The property 
has no improvements of contributory value. 
The purpose of this appraisal is to estimate the market value of the fee simple interest in 
the property. The estimate of value is based on an AS IS CONDITION of the property as of the 
date of inspection. Market value, as defined for this report, is the most probable price in terms 
of money which a property should bring in the competitive and open market under all conditions 
requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeably, and assuming 
the price is not affected by undue stimulus. 
The accompanying complete appraisal, which follows, describes my method and contains 
data gathered in my investigation. My analysis, opinions and conclusions are based upon the facts 
presented in the report. 
After careful consideration and analysis, I am of the opinion that the MARKET VALUE 
of the land and improvements, in an AS IS CONDITION, as of May 29, 1996 is: 
ONE MILLION SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND NO/100 
($1,072,800.00) DOLLARS 
I trust this report is sufficient for the purposes intended. 
^-Respectfully Submitted, 
Jerry K. Webber 
Utah State Certified General Appraiser 
License Number CG00037024 
JRW/sm 
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Summary of 
Location: 
Purpose of Appraisal: 
Effective Date of Value: 








Highest and Best Use: 
Vacant: 




Sales Comparison Approach: 
Estimated Final Value, As Is: 
Estimated Market Exposure: 
mportant Conclusions 
6200 South 1200 West 
Murray City, Utah 
Estimate Value of the Fee Estate 
May 29, 1996 
June 5, 1996 
James R. Parker 
Douglas A. and Leone S. Parker 
Udell G. and Elizabeth M. Parker 
33.5247 acres in three parcels 
$ 25.55 paid for 1995, entire parcel 
part in 100 year flood, panel 490103-0002C 
R-1-10, single family dwellings, Murray City 
10,000 square foot minimum lot size 
none of contributory value 




for land only 
$ 1,072,800 
4 - 6 months 
O I 
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( 6200 South 1200 West) 
Purpose of Appraisal 
The purpose of this appraisal is to estimate the "Market Value" of the following described 
property located at the above captioned site as of May 29, 1996. The rights included in the 
estimation of value are based on fee simple ownership, unless otherwise noted in the body of this 
report. Fee simple title the pure and unencumbered ownership in real property. The primary 
limitations on this form of ownership are controlled by the government for the benefit of society 
as a whole, or private restrictions that are entered into by individuals. These limitations are 
generally in the areas of public health, taxes, eminent domain, easements and rights of way. 
Function of Report 
The function of this report is to aid the client in making decisions relating to the property. 
This property is part of a martial estate. The applicant has requested the appraiser estimate the 
market value of the entire site as of the date of inspection. 
Scope of Appraisal 
An appraisal is an estimate of value based upon comparison of a property to other 
properties. As such, appraisal is not an exact science, but an art. The appraiser interprets market 
data in much the same way a well informed buyer and seller do. As part of this appraisal, the 
appraiser conducted a number of independent investigations and analyses. He relied on data 
retained in his office files, which are continuously and regularly updated. The investigations 
undertaken and the major sources used in this report are listed below. 
The appraiser examined published data of the State of Utah and local authorities for 
demographic data, land use policies and trends, growth forecasts, employment data and forecasts 
and construction data and forecasts. Data published by the Utah Office of Planning and Budget, 
Utah Department of Employment Security, Utah Department of Community and Economic 
Development, Utah State Tax Commission, Utah Energy Office and the University of Utah, 
Bureau of Economic and Business Research were utilized as they affected similar properties as that 
under appraisal. 
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( 6200 South 1200 West) 
Data published by local real estate brokers and consultants was also considered in the 
economic rental, vacancy and typical expenses for this type of property use. The data considered 
was also personally verified by the appraiser during the completion of this assignment. The extent 
of the work and the size of the report are intended to by appropriate in relation to the significance 
of the appraisal problem. 
The appraiser physically inspected the property on various occasions. The most recent 
being May 29, 1996. Photographs utilized in this report to depict the property were taken by the 
appraiser during these inspections. There are no improvements of contributory value on the site 
as of the date of inspection. 
The site was compared to other sites in the area that have recently sold, or are currently 
offered for sale. The sales were personally confirmed by the appraiser with the buyer, seller or 
agent involved in the transaction. Each sale was personally inspected by the appraiser. 
Utah is not a disclosure state, and as such data on each sale or lease is not public 
information. When a property sells, buyers and sellers are not required to disclose details of the 
exchange to any person or governmental authority. Comparable sales information is generally 
obtained from Multiple Listing Services (MLS), or,other sources. The appraiser has attempted 
to verify all pertinent information. The data contained in-this report and the appraisers files is 
deemed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. Expenditure of the time and expense necessary to 
provide unimpeachable verification of all facts is beyond the scope of this appraisal. 
Competency of the Appraiser 
The appraiser has completed assignments of similar land in the Salt Lake Metropolitan 
Area. His experience is such that the completion of this report can be completed in compliance 
and to conform with the competency provisions as adopted by the Institute of Real Estate 
Appraisers and The Appraisal Foundation. 
Date of Report 
This estimate of value report was completed by the appraiser June 5, 1996. The effective 
date of value is May 29, 1996, the date last physical inspection of the site. 
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( 6200 South 1200 West) 
Type of Appraisal Report 
This is a Restricted Appraisal Report, which is intended to comply with reporting 
requirements set forth under Standards Rule 2-2 ( c ) of the Uniform Standards of Professional 
Appraisal Practice for a Restricted Report. As such, it presents limited discussion of the data, 
reasoning, and analysis that were uses in the appraisal process to develop the appraiser's opinion of 
value. Supporting documentation concerning the data, reasoning, and analysis is retained in the 
appraiser's file. The depth of discussion contained in this report is specific to the needs of the client 
and for the intended use stated below. The appraiser is not responsible for the unauthorized use of 
this report. 
Uniform Appraisal Standards 
This report is prepared in accordance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal 
Practice as adopted by the Institute of Real Estate Appraisers and the Appraisal Foundation. The 
appraisers is a certified general appraiser in the State of Utah, and has completed all requirements 
to continue in this status until June 30, 1997. This appraisal may not be used in a federally related 
financial transaction and is subject to the requirements of Title XI of the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989. 
Definition of Market Value 
Market Value as used in this report is defined as follows: 
The most probable price in terms of money, which a property should bring in a competitive and 
open market, under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting 
prudently, knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus. 
Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified date and the 
passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby: 
1. buyer and seller are typically motivated. 
2. both parties are well informed or well advised, and each acting in what they consider 
their own best interest. 
3. a reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market. 
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( 6200 South 1200 West) 
4. payment is made in terms of cash in United States Dollars or in terms of financial 
arrangements comparable thereto. 
5. the price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special 
or creative financing concessions granted by anyone associated with the sale.1 
Legal Description 
Three parcels of land containing a total of 33.5247 acres of land in the following described 
parcels. 
Parcel A. 0.44 acres in the following 
Beginning at a point on the East Bank of the North Jordan Canal, said point being 
South 883.46 feet and East 507.66 feet from the Northwest corner of Section 23, 
Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence North 89°54'14" East 1395.21 feet along an existing fence line to the West 
bank of the Jordan River; thence South 23 °53' 14" West 1083.42 feet; thence North 
87°02'59" West 862.48 feet along an existing fence line and the extension of said 
fence line to the East Bank of the North Jordan Canal; thence along said canal the 
following courses, North 22°22,49" East 195.96 feet; thence North 37° 14'38" East 
128.08 feet; thence North 19°38'17" East 57.52 feet; thence North l°ll '57n West 
37.48 feet; thence North 16°00'49" West 345.60 feet; thence North 46°29 fir 
West 174.15 feet; thence North 46°29'03" West 33.28 feet; thence North 
12o02'00" West 96.18 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel B. 19.938 acres in the following 
Beginning South 263.999 feet and East 646.588 feet from the Northwest corner of 
Section 23, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; East 
260.915 feet; North 85° East 1094.144 feet to the West Bank of Jordan River; 
South 04°27'02" West 74.946 feet; South 02°52'0" East 220.63 feet; South 
0°29'46" East 214.0847 feet; South 25°36'52" West 235.472 feet; South 
89°54' 14" West 1395.206 feet to the East Bank of the North Jordan Canal; North 
12°02' West 138.311 feet; North 05°08'28" East 84.136 feet; North 34°59'01" 
East 168.055 feet; North 24°24'12" East 164.009 feet; North 04°26'20" East 
83.111 feet; North 14°18'11" West 41.776 feet to beginning. 
1
 Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Insurance Regulations 563.17-la and 571.1b. adopted December 21T 1987, 
with the simultaneous withdrawal of FHLBB Memorandum R-41-c, effective January 7, 1988. Also as defined in 
Rules and Regulations, Federal Register. Volume 55, Number 165, page 34696 as of Friday, August 24, 1990. 
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( 6200 South 1200 West) 
Parcel C. 13.1467 acres in the following 
Beginning South 883.46 feet and East 507.66 feet from Northwest corner of 
Section 23, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; North 
89°54'14" East 1289.773 feet; South 25° West 104.574 feet; Southerly along a 
curve to the left 38.363 feet; South 18° West 461.575 feet; Southwesterly along a 
curve to the right 106.814 feet; South 63° West 312.027 feet; Westerly along a 
curve to the right 52.659 feet; South 86°35'55" West 54.861 feet; Southerly along 
a curve to the right 160.634 feet; South 18°45' West 15.371 feet; North 87°02,59" 
West 512.826 feet; North 22°22'49" East 195.96 feet; North 37°14'38" East 
128.077 feet; North 19°38'17" East 57.522 feet; North 1°11'57" West 37.476 
feet; North 16°00'49" West 345.597 feet; North 46°29,11" West 174.161 feet; 
North 46o29'03" West 33.28 feet; North 12°02' West 96.18 feet to beginning. 
Contains 19.05 acres more of less. 
Title Holder 
According to the ownership records of Salt Lake County, title to the property is currently 
in the name of James R. Parker, Douglas A. and Leone S. Parker and Udell G. and Elizabeth M. 
Parker. Carla K. Parker, a partner in the Murray Parkway Associates, LLC reports the property 
has been under contract to sell for $30,000 per acre. The agreement is between Ms. Parker and 
the owner for parts of the above described properties. 
Marketing Time 
The property is primarily comprised of vacant land. During the past 36 months sales of 
1 acre or larger parcels have been very active. This activity is a result of the large amount of 
speculative building taking place in Salt Lake County. For the past 18 months residential building 
activity has been very brisk. For the first quarter of 1996, 1,335 permits were issued for single 
family units in Salt Lake County, many in Murray, Riverton, South Jordan and West Jordan. For 
all of 1995, 4,909 permits were issued for single family dwellings. For 1994, 4,447 permits were 
issued for single family dwellings, for 1993 4,510 permits were issued. During 1992, 3,831 
building permits were issued for single family dwellings in Salt Lake County, for 1991 3,200 
permits were issued and for 1990 2,178 single family dwelling permits were issued. This large 
increase in building activity has had a positive impact on the resale of acreage in most areas of Salt 
Lake County. The appraiser has also discussed the land market and residential development 
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( 6200 South 1200 West) 
market with developers and real estate agents and been informed that little available development 
land has resulted in a very tight market. Estimate market exposure for this 1.50 + acres of land 
is less than 6 months. 
The Salt Lake Board of Realtors Multiple Listing service compiles data relating to resales 
of existing homes in all areas of Salt Lake. For 1995, 1,062 homes were offered for sale in this 
area, with 547 sold. For 1994, 874 homes were offered for sale with 529 sold. Average sales 
price for 1995 was $135,480. The ratio of sold properties to available equates to over 50 % of 
available properties sell during a 6 month listing period. This data clearly indicates a firming up 
of the residential market. 
Tax Data 
The Salt Lake County Assessor identifies parcel B as tax parcel number 21-23-102-006. 
The property was assessed for tax purposes as agricultural land. Estimated land value, was 
$1,080. Taxes for 1995 were paid in the amount of $13.59. 
The Salt Lake County Assessor identifies parcel C as tax parcel number 21-23-102-010. 
The property was assessed for tax purposes as agricultural land. Estimated land value, was $950. 
Taxes for 1995 were paid in the amount of $11.96. 
Each of the properties is assessed as greenbelt land. This assessment method results in 
significant reductions in assessed value, and as a result a large reduction in tax liability. Greenbelt 
classification must be requested by the property owners. The owner must satisfy the assess that 
the property is being put to an agricultural use, and is producing agricultural products or grazing 
of livestock. If the property is found to not comply with greenbelt provisions due to an audit, 
change in use or transfer of ownership, the tax savings for the most recent 5 years, as a result of 
the greenbelt classification, must be repaid to the county. If the property has been classified as 
greenbelt for less than 5 years, only the savings for the period of time the property was classified 
as greenbelt must be paid. These renumerations as a result of the change from greenbelt to other 
use can amount to a significant amount of money for the maximum term of 5 years. The 
agreement between Carla Parker and the sellers of the property is that the sellers pay all greenbelt 
renumerations. 
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Taxes in the Salt Lake County are on an ad valorem basis. By statute of the State of Utah 
the assessor of each county must estimate the Market Value of each parcel of property. This 
estimate of Market Value is statutorily reduced by 20% to cover sales costs, points, discounts and 
commissions. The resulting 80% of Market Value is assessed value for commercial property. 
Residential property is statutorily reduced by the 20% for sales costs, and an additional 20% for 
a homestead exemption. Assessed value for commercial property thus becomes 80% of the 
estimated market value and assessed value for single family residential property is 60% of 
estimated market value. 
As a result of a tax appeal involving State Assessed Property, the rollback of estimated 
market value has been altered for 1991. For 1991 assessed value for residential property is 95% 
of estimated market value and 67% for residential property. The percentage of rollback is 
adjusted each year based on the accuracy of each county assessor compared to State Assessed 
property. 
For tax year 1995 and 1994, commercial property received no reduction in value from 
estimated market value to taxable value. In effect commercial property taxable value was 100% of 
the assessors estimate of market value. For residential property, the reduction from market value to 
assessed value was 32%. 
As is typical in mass appraisal programs, property usually has an estimated market value 
less than true market value. Property owners who are over assessed usually appeal the assessor's 
opinion of value. Property owners who have property under assessed do not usually appeal. In 
past years the appraiser has found little correlation between assessed value and market value. 
It is also common for property to be over assessed. If the property is over assessed, the 
owner must appeal the estimate of value during the period of time the board of equalization meets. 
In Salt Lake county this is usually during the month of August of each year. The burden of proof 
of the inaccuracy is on the property owner. A recent purchase of the property, with evidence of 
price paid, is usually sufficient evidence of an over assessment. If the property has been owned 
by the current owner for a long period of time, the property owner must furnish the board of 
equalization proof in the form of comparable sales. In some cases the property owner may provide 
the board of equalization a full appraisal of their property. If the board of equalization does not 
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( 6200 South 1200 West) 
reduce the assessment as a result of the appeal, the property owner may appeal to the State Tax 
Commission. 
The adjusted assessed value is multiplied by a tax rate to compute taxes. The tax rates are 
set by various taxing districts. This property has taxes set by the Murray School District, Salt 
Lake County General Fund, Salt Lake County Bond Interest, Salt Lake County Flood Control, Salt 
Lake County Health, Murray City Library, Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, South 
Salt Lake County Mosquito Abatement District, Central Utah Water District and Murray City 
funds for police, fire and zoning enforcement. The tax rate for this property was .0125860 for 
1995. The tax rate as a percentage of estimated market value is 0.0125860 or 1.26 %. 
This property appears to be comparably assessed in comparison to other property in the 
area. If the property were sold, it is unlikely that a sale for more than current assessor's market 
value would result in an increase in taxes. 
City and Area Data 
Subject property is located about 9 lA miles southwest of the center of downtown Salt Lake 
City. The property is located in Murray City, one of the many incorporated and unincorporated 
areas making up the Greater Salt Lake metropolitan Area. -The southern quadrant of the Greater 
Salt Lake Metropolitan Area is primarily comprised of bedroom communities, local shopping and 
industrial uses. 
The Salt Lake Metropolitan area contains about 64% of the 1990 census population of 
1,722,850 people in the State of Utah. The population of Utah increased about 37.9% between 
1970 and 1980 and 17.9% between 1980 and 1990. The Salt Lake Metropolitan area had a 
population increase of 13.1 % between 1980 and 1987. Population increase from 1980 to 1990 was 
17.3%. This population growth is tenth highest in the United States for 1990, and is primarily 
from natural increases (births less deaths). The urban areas lie in the four counties (Utah, Salt 
Lake, Davis, and Weber) of the Wasatch Front. This area accounts for 76% of the state 
population and 5% of the land area. The Incorporated Salt Lake City area has had a population 
decrease steadily since 1970. This decrease in population is caused by conversions of older 
residential properties to business uses. The population has been shifted to bedroom communities 
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to the south of the city. The following page shows the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area, with subject 
property noted. 
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Area Map 
The enclosed map shows the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area, with subject property noted. 
•n arterial map of 
SALT LAKE CITY 
& VICINITY 
0 l 2 J l 
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The owner, applicant and appraiser are familiar with the State of Utah and Salt Lake City, 
and a discussion of the regional and area data as it affects the property is deemed unnecessary for 
completion of this assignment. 
Neighborhood Data 
The neighborhood surrounding the property is a mixed use area. There are many 
residential subdivisions in the area built during the 1970's and 1980's. The neighborhood is 
generally bordered on the north by 4500 South. North of this boundary uses are more newly 
constructed residential oriented, with little vacant land and older residential. The east boundary 
is the extension of the 1-15 freeway right of way, at about 400 West. This barrier separates the 
mixed uses of the neighborhood from older residential and commercial uses east of the freeway. 
The west boundary is the extension of Redwood road at about 1700 West, which separates the 
mixed uses of the neighborhood from primarily newer residential uses west of Redwood Road. 
The southern boundary would be considered as 7200 South, which separates mixed uses of this 
neighborhood from single family residential uses and agricultural uses to the south. The major 
traffic arteries are developed with retail sales and traffic oriented business. The secondary streets 
are primarily residential in use, and range from single family to high density multi family. 
Generally, this area has had stable growth in the past 5 years. The area is developed with 
high traffic retail uses along the major roadways of 400 West, 1300 West and 1700 West. The 
neighborhood is also improved with many retail strip type centers, primarily along the major 
traffic arteries. There are also some wholesale sales facilities in the neighborhood. 
The area is the drainage of the Jordan River. The Jordan River drains the Salt Lake Valley 
from the south the northwest. It ultimately empties into the Great Salt Lake. It is the drainage 
of may canyon streams, irrigation canals and other drainage in Salt Lake County. It generally 
bisects the neighborhood. It has crossings at 4500 South, 4800 South, 5400 South, 6400 South 
and 7800 South. The river bottom area is also developed with various walking and riding trails 
that run along both sides of the river. There are also some passenger bridges that cross the river 
from east to west. 
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Newer development in the area has been primarily in traffic related retail sales along the 
major traffic arteries. The area currently includes many small retail stores, neighborhood 
shopping centers, fast food restaurants and other traffic related retail uses. 
The major east to west roadways in the neighborhood are 4500 South, 4800 South, 5300 
South, 6400 South and 7000 South. Each connects eastern Salt Lake County to western Salt Lake 
County. The major north to south roads are 300 West, 1300 West and Redwood Road. 
This area is considered an average residential area with its many single and multi family 
dwellings. The area has an advantage for supply of labor as well as proximity to needed retail 
facilities. Freeway access to all parts of the metro area is good with 1-215 and 1-15 having major 
intersections and on and off ramps in the immediate area. 
Site Data 
Subject property is located about 9 lA miles southwest of the center of downtown Salt Lake 
City. The property is located within the incorporated limits of Murray City. Murray City is one 
of the many areas which make up the metropolitan Salt Lake City Area. The southwestern 
quadrant of the metropolitan area is primarily comprised of commercial and residential uses. The 
major cities are Salt Lake City, South Salt Lake City, West Valley City, Murray City and West 
Jordan City. Large islands of land in the southwest quadrant are not located within one of the 
incorporated cities, and fall under the jurisdiction of Salt Lake County. The area is mostly 
residential with some industrial uses in the quadrant, located primarily between 2100 South and 
9000 South near the 1-15 corridor. There are also some industrial uses near 2100 South and 4000 
West. Most residents in this area commute to other portions of the metro area for employment. 
The site about 30 feet below the grade of 1300 West, and is above the elevation of the 
Jordan River, which is located west of the site. It has a general slope downwards from the west 
to east. This change in elevation is typical for the area. The site is similar in topography to the 
general area. The following page contains a copy of the topography map of the area. 
Page 13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 6200 South 1200 West) 
Topography Map 
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The property is bordered on the west by the North Jordan Irrigation Canal. This canal is 
used by many farmers for irrigation of crops. This canal runs along the crest of the hill that 
borders the Jordan River drainage. 
The property is bordered on the east by the Jordan River. Portions of the Jordan River 
drainage have been developed by Murray City with public parks, wetlands and wildlife habitat. 
There are many walking, jogging and bicycle paths on both sides of the drainage. Recently 
Murray City developed a public golf course along the east portions of the Jordan Rive drainage, 
just east of the property. West Jordan is in the process of developing various walking paths, parks 
and wildlife habitat along the drainage of the Jordan River that runs through its corporate limits, 
just south of the property. The master plan of Salt Lake County calls for development of the 
Jordan Rive drainage with parks, wildlife habitat and open space. 
The appraiser is not aware of any soil or sub-soil conditions in the area which would 
prohibit further development or endanger the present improvements. According to the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the property is partially located within the 
identifiable boundaries of a flood hazard area. It is located on panel 490103-0002C. The flood 
map was adopted September 30, 1994. 
The following page contains a copy of the flood map, with subject property noted. 
Page 15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 6200 South 1200 West) 
Flood Map 
:ATION 
hwest corner or the Murray City 
section of Riverside and Halcion 
Monument #10) 
section of Fair Haven Circle and 
'an River Monument #11) 
Page 16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 6200 South 1200 West) 
Access to the site is limited. Currently the only points of ingress and egress to the site is 
from El Cimarron Drive, located north of the property. El Cimarron Drive is a residential 
collector road the connects to 1300 West. The residential street known as Crystal River Drive, 
terminates at the northeast corner of the property. Crystal River Drive is used by Murray city to 
access public utilities, water and sewer lines that are located within the Murray portion of the 
Jordan River Parkway. Crystal River Drive does not provide public access to the Jordan River 
Park or to subject property. 
The size of the property presents some development problems in that the site has only one 
access point. There is no access to the site from the south, east or west. With 10,000 square foot 
lots, a normal residential development of the site would yield about 100 to 115 lots. With only 
one access point, approval of the project in its entirety is remote. There is a possibility that this 
property can be developed with property to the east or south and overcome the objections of the 
one access point. 
The land to the east of the site is owned and controlled by Murray City. This land lies 
between the property and the Jordan River channel. According to Salt Lake County records, the 
areas east of the site have been owned by Murray City for more than 5 years. 
The site has been optioned to Murray Parkway, LLC for about 10 months. Carla Parker 
is a partner in this development. She reports the development company is in the process of 
obtaining approval for development of the entire property. 
The property is impacted by the Jordan River meander corridor. This meander corridor 
is defined by the historic channel of the Jordan River. Over the years, the Jordan River has 
changed courses due to flooding, sedimentation in the river bottom and erosion. This meander 
zone includes many oxbow lakes, ponds and in some cases has left some land areas separated from 
access to roadways. The appraiser is aware of some areas north of subject in which the changing 
river course has resulted in land locked parcels of land. 
Salt Lake County Flood Control regulates the areas located withing the Jordan River 
Meander Area. With the Jordan River levels and potential flooding impacting more than one 
municipality, they have been assigned responsibility for the areas of the river bottoms. Any 
development located within the area identified as the meander zone is subjected to approval by Salt 
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Lake County Flood Control. In the past they have required various levies, rock filled trenches, 
river bank improvements and dedication of open areas prone to flooding. Mr. Brent Beadal of Salt 
Lake County Flood Control has informed the appraiser that the developer of this property has 
proposed the installation of a rock filled trench to control relocation of the channel along this 
property. This rock filled trench is to be installed along the entire easterly boundary of the 
property. Mr. Tom Sicusky, of Earthfax, reports the estimated cost of this rock filled trench is 
from $110,000 to $130,000. Salt Lake County is in favor of this alternative and would approve 
the trench. Murray City has taken the position that the rock filled trench does not protect sewer, 
water and other utility lines located in their portion of the Murray Parkway. Murray City would 
prefer reinforcement of the west bank of the Jordan River with rip rap. According to Mr. 
Sicusky, the cost of rip rap is about $65,000 to $70,000. Salt Lake County is not in favor of this 
rip rap solution in that they are in the process of an experimental vegetation plan for the Jordan 
River. The rip rap reinforcement would threaten the integrity of the vegetation experiment. 
The appraiser has calculated that the area that is impacted by the Jordan River Meander 
Corridor contains about 6.78 acres. With the cost of being recently optioned for $30,000 per acre, 
the "lost" value, if the Jordan River Meander Corridor were left in its natural state, is $203,400. 
The current owners have not yet reached and acceptable resolution to the problem of the 
size of the development (one access point) or the Jordan River Meander area. With the most 
expensive of the solutions being $130,000, the cost of the rock filled trench could equate to $3,879 
per acre for the entire 33.5247 acres of land. Compared to eliminating the 6.78 acres from 
development, the cost of the rock filled trench is a reasonable and economically supported 
solution. 
The site has visual exposure from 6400 South and also the 1-215 freeway. Access to the 
site is provided by El Cimarron Drive, located immediately north of the site. There is no access 
from either 6400 South, 1300 West or 1-215. Traffic along El Cimarron Drive is light and 
comprised of residential commuters to homes north of subject. There are currently no dividing 
islands separating opposing lanes of traffic in El Cimarron Drive. The major north to south 
roadway in the area is 1700 West, about 5 blocks to the west of subject. The major east to west 
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artery is 6400 South, located south of the site. Development on 6400 South and Redwood Road 
includes fast food restaurants, retail sales and local shopping. 
Access to 1-15 is provided about 2 miles northeast of the site at 400 West and 5300 South, 
with a 4 way on/off ramp. Access to 1-215 is about 1 miles northwest of the site at Redwood Road 
and 5600 South. Visual exposure is good from all directions. 
The property is located within the incorporated limits of Murray City and falls under 
various authorities. Police and fire protection are provided by Murray City, and are considered 
good. Taxes are collected annually by Salt Lake County and are on an ad-valorem basis. Taxes 
in Salt Lake County are typically 1-1/2% of market value. Business and use regulations are 
administered and enforced strictly by Murray City. 
The primary uses in the area are associated with single family dwellings and limited 
neighborhood type commercial uses. There are some retail stores, restaurants and variety stores 
in the area. The secondary streets are primarily developed with single and two family residential 
uses on lots of 6,000 to 8,000 square feet. The area is nearly 60% developed, with some large 
parcels of vacant land awaiting development or used for agriculture. There has been some new 
development in the immediate area. Overall this area has had good and stable growth in the past 
5 years. This is similar to the majority of Salt Lake County. 
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Lot Size 
The property is irregular in shape. It has frontage of about 1,000 feet on El Cimarron 
Drive. The property is bounded on the east by the drainage of the Jordan River drainage. It is 
bordered on the east by the drainage of the North Jordan Canal. 
The appraiser has not been provided a copy of a survey of the site. From the purchase 
agreements, the total land area is 0.44 acres from James R. Parker, 19.938 acres from Douglas 
A. and Leone S. Parker and 13.1467 acres from Udell G. And Elizabeth M. Parker. 
The following page contains a plat map of the area with the property noted. 
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Street Improvements 
The following street improvements presently serve subject property along its north 
boundary: hard surfaced street, sewer, water, gas electricity and telephone. 
There is currently a sanitary sewer main line located east of the sit, located within the 
Murray Parkway land. 
The property is bordered on the east by the Jordan River drainage, that flows in a 
northwesterly direction. 
Zoning 
According to the "Use" District map before me, subject property is located within the 
jurisdiction of Murray City. The property is presently zoned R-1-10. Provisions of the ordinance 
for R-1-10 permit medium density residential uses. Minimum lot size is 10,000 square feet per 
lot. 
The following page contains a copy of the zoning map, with subject property outlined in 
red. 
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Zoning Map 
NCHESTER ST u« 
6900 6809 
700 WEST 
y City Community Development Department 
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Description of Improvements 
The property currently has no improvements of contributory value. 
Highest and Best Use Defined 
That reasonable and probable use that supports the highest present value, as defined, as of 
the effective date of the appraisal. 
Alternatively, that use, from among reasonably probable and legal alternative uses, found 
to be physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and which results in 
highest land value. 
The definition immediately above applies specifically to the highest and best use of the 
land. It is to be recognized that in cases where a site has existing improvements on it, the highest 
and best use may very well be determined to be different from the existing use. The existing use 
will continue, however, unless and until land value in its highest and best use exceeds the total 
value of the property in its existing use.2 
Implied in this definition is the recognition of contribution of each specific use to the 
overall community development as well as achieving maximum profit for each individual property 
owner. The highest and best use is determined by the appraiser, and as such is only an opinion 
based upon analysis of facts. In actual appraisal practice, the concept of highest and best use 
represents the premise upon which all value conclusions or estimations are based. A property 
fully utilizing its highest and best use would be the most profitable, probable and legally permitted 
use. This use may be influenced by the improvements which are on the property at the time of 
appraisal. Or the existing improvements may be detrimental to the highest and best use of the 
property and would represent minimal or negative value. 
In estimating highest and best use, there are essentially four stages of analysis: 
1. Possible Use - What uses of the site in question are physically possible? 
2. Permissible Use - What uses are permitted by zoning and deed restrictions on the site 
in question? 
Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, compiled and edited by Byrl N. Boyce, Ph.D., published by Ballinger 
Publishing Company of Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
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3. Feasible use - Which possible and permissible uses will produce a net return to the 
owner of the site? 
4. Highest and best use - Among the feasible uses, which use will produce the highest net 
return or highest present worth? 
The highest and best use of the land (or site) if vacant and available for use may be 
different from the highest and best use of the improved property. This is true when the 
improvement is not an appropriate use, but it makes a contribution to the total property value in 
excess of the value of the site. 
The previously discussed tests must be applied to the property as improved and as vacant. 
In arriving at the highest and best use of the property, it was analyzed: 1) as if vacant and 
available for development, and 2) as presently improved. 
Highest and Best Use as a Vacant Site 
In considering the highest and best use of the site as though vacant, the appraiser must 
consider the size of the lot to be a benefit upon the possible uses that are physically possible. The 
lot size of 33.5247 acres is of sufficient size to permit a developer the ability to install necessary 
infrastructure and roads to support most types of residential-developments. A site of say 20 acres 
could be of sufficient size to allocate the large sewer, water and engineering costs of any 
development. This site has other obstacles to its development, in that access two points of access 
must be provided. With the land located just south of the property being planned for residential 
development, some cooperative form of access can be obtained over this contiguous property. 
Under the provisions of the zoning ordinance, the property must be used for residential 
uses. The R-l-10 zoning permits single family dwellings on lots of 10,000 square feet or larger. 
The ultimate highest and most profitable use for the site is to be used in conjunction with 
other land in the area. Property owners west or south of the site could utilize this site in 
conjunction with other land owned and with frontage to either 6400 South or 1300 West. The cost 
of bridging the North Jordan Canal could easily be allocated over the site area of 33.5247 acres 
or more. 
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The zoning ordinance does not limit the use of the site to a great extent. It should also be 
noted, Murray City and Salt Lake County have not been receptive to "spot" zoning of specific site 
within their jurisdiction. They have historically utilized master plans and zoning guidelines that 
allow for an orderly transition from less intensive uses to more intensive uses. Under their 
historic plan, they would not spot zone a parcel of land to permit the construction of a shopping 
center adjoining land zoned for limited residential development. They would historically buffer 
the more intensive uses from the least intensive uses by allowing moderate intensity uses between 
the two. For example, Murray City Zoning Department may buffer commercial and single family 
uses with high density residential uses. 
As to permissible uses, the site is zoned for single family uses. The potential uses available 
for the highest and best use of the site are quite limited. The feasibility of the use must be 
influenced by recent development in the area. Most of the newer development in the area of the 
property is in single family residential subdivisions on lots of 10,000 square feet or larger. With 
the recent decline in interest rates, there has been a resurgence of single family dwelling 
construction. There are many single family homes in the $100,000 range being speculatively built 
by developers. Many builders report brisk sales, with many homes sold prior to completion. 
The appraiser is of the opinion that the highest and best use of this site is for single family 
dwelling uses. 
Estimation of Land Value Vacant 
The appraiser will utilize the direct sales comparison approach to estimate the value of the 
land as though vacant. The approach involves direct comparisons of the property under appraisal 
to similar properties that have recently sold in the market place. 
Carefully verified and analyzed market data are good indications of value, especially if they 
represent actions of typical buyers, sellers, users and investors in the market place. This approach 
is based upon the principle of substitution, in that a prudent buyer should not pay more for a 
property than it will cost to buy a comparable substitute property. The price paid by buyers is 
usually the result of an extensive search in which alternatives are compared. The property 
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purchased usually represents the best available balance between the needs of the buyer and 
purchase price. 
Individual sales may deviate from a market norm. A sufficient number of sales tends to 
produce a pattern indicating the action of buyers and sellers in the open market. If sufficient 
numbers of market derived sales are available, the resulting pattern provides a good indication of 
market value. 
The appraiser has analyzed sales of vacant land in the area, and discovered reliable 
information on each. The sales that are included in this report are the most recent and similar 
available. 
Each sale differs from the subject property, in that none have an identical location. 
Adjustments will be made between the known sales and the unknown value estimate of subject. 
The unit of comparison considered is the sales price per acre. This unit of comparison is 
commonly found in the Salt Lake Market. The important consideration is sufficient size to allow 
the highest and best use of the site to be obtained. Each sale has a similar highest and best use as 
subject. Properties are bought, sold and compared on the basis of sales price per acre. This unit 
of comparison is the quantification of purchase price and size. The following sales are noted, 
which have recently taken place and are discussed and analyzed on the pages that follow. 
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Terms of Sale: 
Sales Price per Acre: 
Confirmed by: 
Comments: Subdivided into 









Terms of Sale: 
Sales Price per Acre: 
Confirmed by: 
Comments: 
1245 Bullion Street 
Murray City, Utah 
10.00 acres 
Agricultural 
all in street 
April, 1994 
Alan Tratos 
Treasure Valley Real Estate 
$ 400,000 
cash to seller 
$ 40,000 
agent 
single family lots with adjoining property. 
3101 South 3690 West 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
2.00 acres 
Residential 
all in street 
August, 1994 
Ricky Lee Warr 
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Terms of Sale: 
Sales Price per Acre: 
Confirmed by: 
1225 West Bullion Street 
Murray City, Utah 
1.03 acres 
A-l 
all in street 
May, 1995 
Brent Romney 





Comments: Developed with adjoining property into single family lots. 









Terms of Sale: 
Sales Price per Acre: 
Confirmed by: 
3300 South 4800 West 
West Valley City, Utah 
15.93 acres 
R-l-8 
all in street 
August, 1995 
Jean Paras 
Eastland Development Group 
$ 597,950 
cash to seller 
$37,536 
agent 
Comments: Subdivided into single family lots with adjoining property. 
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Terms of Sale: 
Sales Price per Acre: 
Confirmed by: 
Comments: Subdivided into single 









Terms of Sale: 
Sales Price per Acre: 
Confirmed by: 
Comments: 
1750 West 6020 South 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
26.00 acres 
Agricultural 
all in street, limited access 
November, 1995 
Bollinger 
Eastland Development Group 
$781,200 
cash to seller 
$ 30,046 
agent 
family lots with adjoining property. 
6001 South Jordan Canal Road 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
18.66 acres 
agricultural 
all in street 
November, 1995 
Betty B. Bollinger 
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Summary of Land Sales 
The following is a summary of the sales. They are listed in order from the most dated to 






















































Adjustments to Sales 
Each of the comparable sales differed from subject property in physical and other 
characteristics. The most notable being date of sale, location, utility and size. All have similar 
zoning, and highest and best use as does subject. An analysis of each of the sales in these 
characteristics is as follows: 
Date of sale 
Generally, during the past 2 years, real estate values in Salt Lake City have increased. The 
sales utilized would support this conclusion. Comparing Sale #2 to Sale #6, the data would 
suggest that land values have increased 22.99% over the 1.25 years between the sales. If sales 
#1 and #6 are compared the data suggest that land values declined 6.21 % over the same period. 
The sample considered is not of sufficient size for any in depth statistical analysis. With 
the definite trend noted, any adjustment to the sales for date of sale is supported. The appraiser 
will adjust the sales based on an increase in value of 6% per year. 
It should be noted that a change in value over time is not the result of the passage of time, 
but rather a change in market conditions over time. With a definite trend noted in the sales 
considered, any adjustment is subjective. As a result, the adjustment reflects the change in market 
conditions over the time period of the sales. 
Each of the sales will be adjusted +10% per year for the passage of time. 
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Location 
Sale #5 is located in a similar area, compared to subject. This property has limited access 
to public roads and was developed in conjunction with the adjoining property. Comparing this 
sale to sale #6, the sale with good access require a - 19.90% adjustment for location. Sales #1, 
#2, #3, #4 and #6 will be adjusted -20% for location. 
Size 
Generally smaller more utile parcels of property sell for more per acre than larger parcels. 
This is the result of a quantity discount and the fact larger parcels have a limited market in terms 
of potential buyers. The following is a summary of the sales, listed in order from the smallest to 






















































The data demonstrates not definite trend as it relates to land size. The smallest sale sold 
for the higher end of the range and the smallest the lower limit of the range. The sales of from 
2.00 acres or larger do not demonstrate any trend. 
Each of the sales of less than 11 acres will be adjusted -20% for size. 
Shape 
Each of the comparable sales were rectangular in shape, similar to subject in utility. No 
adjustment is indicated for shape. 
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Comparable Land Sale Adjustments 

























+ 18 % 
+ 10% 
+ 8 % 
+ 6 % 







































Mean average adjusted price is $31,968 per acre 
Most Probable Sales Price is $30,000 to $35,000 per acre 
Correlation of Land Value 
It should be noted that the mean average sales price of the previously noted sales is $31,968 
per acre. The range of adjusted sales prices from the lowest to highest is very narrow. The 
adjusted sales prices would represent the value range in which the subject must lie. Sale #5 is the 
most like subject in terms of location and is near the lower limit of the range. This sale required 
the least number and gross adjustments, and should be given the greatest weight. 
Sale #6 is similar to subject in size and sales date. This sale defines the upper imit to value 
for land in the area. 
Use of the mean average sales price for the purposes of a final value estimate of value for 
any property is not considered an appropriate appraisal tool. This implies that each of the sales 
considered should be given equal weight in the analysis. In as much as each sale is unique in 
terms of its size, sale date, physical characteristics and location, the mean average can be a 
misleading indicator to value. Some courts have ruled the use of a mean average is not an 
acceptable practice by "experts" in real property valuation, the mean average adjusted sales price 
is communicated only for illustrative purposes, and is not relied upon by the appraiser. 
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A final value conclusion for subject property as vacant of $32,000 per acre is well within 
the range of value indicated and is well supported by the sales offered. This conclusion reflects 
the reliance place on sales #5 and #6. The calculation of value is as follows: 
33,5247 acres @ $32,000 per acre = $ 1,072,790 
Rounded to $ 1,072,800 
Final Value Estimate 
The final value estimate represents the conclusion of the appraisal process. Therefore, after 
carefully considering all of the factors which affect value, including the size, location, age, 
condition of improvements, zoning and present market conditions, it is my considered opinion that 
the decline in the MARKET VALUE of the previously described land as though vacant is: 
ONE MILLION SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND NO/100 
($1,072,800.00) DOLLARS 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Jerry iL jVebber, MAI 
JRW/sm 
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Addenda 
Photographs of Subject Property 
Certification 
Restrictions on Disclosure and Use 
Assumptions and Limiting Conditions 
Qualifications of the Appraiser 
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PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUBJECT PROPERTY 
about 6200 South 1200 West 
Murray City, Utah 
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PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUBJECT PROPERTY 
about 6200 South 1200 West 
Murray City, Utah 
Looking South, across property 
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Murray City, Utah 
Looking Southwest, across property 
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PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUBJECT PROPERTY 
about 6200 South 1200 West 
Murray City, Utah 
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RESTRICTIONS UPON DISCLOSURE AND USE 
1. Disclosure of the contents of this report is governed by the By-Laws and Regulations of the 
Appraisal Institute. 
2. Without prior written consent and approval of the appraiser, the following restrictions and 
limitations apply: 
a. Neither all nor any part of this report may be reproduced in any form. 
b. No dissemination shall be made to the public through advertising media or any other public 
means of communication. 
c. The conclusions to value, identity of the appraiser, or any reference to the Appraisal Institute 
and the MAI Designation. 
3. Acceptance of and/or use of this appraisal report constitutes acceptance of the stated assumptions, 
limiting conditions and restrictions. 
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ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITING CONDITIONS 
1. The legal description in this appraisal report was received from sources deemed reliable and 
is assumed to be correct, but the appraiser takes no responsibility as to its correctness. 
2. No title opinion is rendered herewith, and the property is appraised as though free and clear 
of all liens and encumbrances, and on the basis of marketable title, with all rights of 
ownership in fee simple. 
3. The improvements are assumed to be within the legally described property and built in 
accordance with the requirements of zoning and building ordinances in effect at the time 
of construction. 
4. The sketches used in this report are included to assist the reader in visualizing the property, 
and the appraiser assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. The appraiser has made no 
survey of the property. 
5. The appraiser is not required to give testimony or appear in court, because of having made 
this appraisal, with reference to the property in question, unless prior arrangements have 
been made. 
6. The distribution of the total valuation in this report between land and improvements applies 
under the existing program of utilization. The separate valuations for land and building 
must not be used in connection with any other appraisals and are invalid if so used. 
7. The value estimate is based on the market and monetary conditions prevailing as of the date 
of value, and cannot be applied to other dates in the past or future. 
8. All market data and other information contained inlhis appraisal report has been gathered 
and reasonably investigated by the appraiser to the extent that it is believed to be correct, 
but is not guaranteed. No market data or information has been withheld which would tend 
to distort the final estimate of value. 
9. The existence of hazardous material, which may or may not be present on the property, was 
not observed by the appraiser. The appraiser has no knowledge of the existence of such 
materials on or in the property. The appraiser, however, is not qualified to detect such 
substances. The presence of substances such as asbestos, urea-formaldehyde foam 
insulation, or other potentially hazardous materials may affect the value of the property. 
The value estimate is predicated on the assumption that there is no such material in or on 
the property that would cause a loss in value. No responsibility is assumed for any 
conditions, or for any expertise or engineering knowledge required to discover them. The 
client is urged to retain an expert in this field, if desired. 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JERRY R.WEBBER, MAI 
REAL ESTATE APPRAISER and CONSULTANT 
APPRAISAL QUALIFICATIONS OF JERRY R.WEBBER 
LICENSES, DEGREES AND MEMBERSHIPS 
Graduated Olympus High School, Salt Lake City, Utah — 1967 
Graduated University of Utah — 1971 — B.S. Degree - Management 
Received Utah Real Estate Salesman's License in 1970 
Received Real Estate Broker's License in 1975 
Member of the National Association of Independent Fee Appraisers (N.A.I.F.A.), IFAS Designation 1974-1991 
Member Appraisal Institute, MAI Designation 
Owner-Broker of Webber Real Estate Company, Salt Lake City, Utah 
Member of National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) and Salt Lake Board of Realtors, G.R.I. Designation 
Chairman National Education Committee, NAIFA, 1989-1991 
President Utah Association of Appraisers, 1991-1992 
Certified General Appraiser, Utah License# CG00037024 
1995-1998 Member, State of Utah Appraiser Registration Certification Board 
APPRAISAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
Successfully completed the following courses: 
Real Estate Appraising 
Residential Appraising 
Capitalization Techniques 
Real Estate Finance 
Uniform Eminent Domain 
Commercial and Investment 
Recreation Property Appraising 
Income Capitalization 
Mortgage Equity and Today's Financing 
Income Capitalization 
Case Studies 
Standards of Professional Practice 
Appraising From Blueprints 
Appraiser as an Expert Witness 
Understanding Limited Appraisal 
Appraisal Review 
Fair Lending and the Appraiser 
Developed 8-hour program of Utah Assoc, of Realtors on Appraising 
Currently approved by the states of Utah, Arizona, Colorado, Nebraska, 
Oregon, Ohio, Maryland and Washington to teach appraisal courses 
Senior Instructor NAIFA 1979-1991 
Qualified as an expert witness in District Courts and Federal Courts 
Author of text: "Principles of Real Estate Appraisal," NAIFA 
Co-author: "Case Studies in Real Estate Appraisal" 
Helped develop Condemnation Seminar for NAIFA 





















LDS Business College 
Utah State Bar 
NAREB 










Utah Association of Appraisers 
Missouri, Oklahoma, Minnesota, Indiana, 
PARTIAL LIST OF CLIENTELE SERVED 
First Security Bank 
Key Bank 
West One Bank 
Zions First National Bank 
Jordan School District 
Intermountain Association of Credit Men 
Small Business Administration 
State of Utah - Building Board 
Tooele County Commission 
Sperry-Univac 
Brighton Bank 
South Summit School District 
Equitable Relocation 
Travelers Insurance 
First Interstate Bank 
Western Management and Maintenance 
Capital City Bank 




City of South Salt Lake 
Alta Industries 
Intermountain Pipe and Welding 
Westinghouse Electric 
Industrial Supply Company 
State of Utah, Natural Resources 
Numerous attorneys in Salt Lake, Davis and Utah Counties 
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PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT W 
ALl-STATE LEGAl SUPPLY CO 
DEBT OWED ON MURRAY PARKWAY ASSOCIATES 4/96 
Doug and Leone Parker 





Parker Family Trust 











James R. Parker 
Less 8/25/95 Down payment 
Balance due 





Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
CAUTION: READ BEFORE YOU SIGN 
(If This is a legally binding contract; if you do not understand it. seek legal advice before you sign. 
(2) This contract is intended to be filled in by lawyers or real estate brokers. All others seek professional advice. 
f3) To assure protection of certain priority rights in the Property, recordation of this contract and any assignments, addenda, or 
legally sufficient notices of interest is highly recommended. 
V M t aTnrLo«r'^m':JKffs'Eiin-g^^yf°e'7')"9USt / 9 — " " " " T " D0U6LAS A' 
(hereafter collectively called "Buyer"), whose address is 
6305 South 1300 West. Murray. UT 84123 
.2. ProRertv.. Seller agr.ees to sell and Buyer agrees to buy the real property (the''Property") located at A p p r o x i m a t e l y 0<sbU SOUt 
. Crysta l R iver Drive
 (ctf,., 8ddresS). in the city of Murray m„n,yn( Sa l t Lake 
State of Utah, described as: 
See Exhibit "A", attached hereto. 
3. Date of Pot session. Seller agrees to deliver possession and Buver agrees to enter into possession of the Propeay on the <-Q™ day of 
August IQ 95. . 
4. Price and Payment. Buyer agrees to pay for the Propeny the purchase price-of A p p r o x i m a t e l y F IVE HUNDRED N I N c . l i -
EIGHT THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY & 0 0 / 1 0 0 - - - - : J f e { s 598.140.0Q payable at Seller's address above given. 
„r,n c;.||,f-« n M . f nn . h . Inlawing . „ „ , . - F 1 H Y I H U U S A N D 5U6 0 0 / 1 0 0 - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - • . • • • . 
The amount of $10,541.15 principal, together with accrued interest is due and payable 
upon the closing of each of the first 52 lots of the 57 lots developed on the Seller's 
property shown on the proposed plat of MURRAY PARKWAY ESTATES SUBDIVISION that fall 
within the boundary of the land being purchased hereunder. Interest will accrue at 
10% per annum on the unpaid balance commencing on the date that the subdivision plat 
is recorded until paid. At the time legal descriptions are finalized, Buyers and 
Sellers agree to execute the necessary documents to convert the terms of this Contract 
to a Note and First Trust Deed, including a Warranty Deed to convey fee title to the 
Buyers. These documents will be hind in Escrow by Merrill Title Company and recorded 
simultaneously with the recordation of the subdivision plat to consumate the conversion, 
'his form is approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 



















CD r Q 
•3 g 
•4J ^ J 
CD co <D to CD c ^ 
0 CD fO g CD 3 
i l l I-"3 -
_<G J£ ^ S ^.J3._I7__ 
• d 





>an No.. PROMISSORY NOTE 
$..5.48,.1.4CLJQQ September 1,919-35. 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promise(s) to pay to . .P .P^M.S A- . - .g^gJ C E R a n d ._lJgQffg. S * PARKER, 
h u s b a n d a n d w i f e , a s j o i n t t e n a n t s 
or order, . m . E . J I I f f l D R ^ ^ ( $ ^ * 1 4 Q . J I Q L _ ) , 
together with interest fcKDtxbataat the rate of..-Ten per cent, (—10-0—%) per annum on the unpaid balance, payable as 
follows, viz: xnterest shall begin ta accrue upon the recordation of the Murray Parkway Estate 
Subdivision. The principal sum of $10,962.80, together with accrued interest shall be 
due and payable upon the closing of the sale of the first fifty (50) lots in the propos< 
Murray Parkway Estate Subdivision encumbered by the Trust Deed securing this Note. 
i 
in lawful money of the United States of America, negotiable and payable at the office of ....-§s.. .djir e c t e n Jyy h o I d e r 
ts 
ell 
without defalcation or discount. All payments hereinabove provided for shall be applied first on accrued interest and balance to 
• reduction of principal. Any installments of principal and interest not paid when due shall, at the option of the legal holder 
hereof, bear interest thereafter at the rate of —Ten _% p e r annum until paid. 
In case of default in the payment of any installment of principal or interest as herein stipulated, then it shall be optional 
with the legal holder of this note to declare the entire principal sum hereof due and payable; and proceedings may at once be 
instituted for the recovery of the same by law, with accrued interest and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
The makers and endorsers severally waive presentment, protest and demand; and waive notice of protest, demand and of dis-
honor and non-payment of this note, and expressly agree that this note, or any payment thereunder, may be extended from time 
to time without in any way effecting the liability of the makers and endorsers thereof. 
This note and the interest thereon is secured by a first iW#Cg3gfcX3ac T r u s t D e e d o n F i f t y F i v e ( 5 5 ) L o t s 
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UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
C A U T I O N : R E A D B E F O R E Y O U SIGN 
(1J This is a tegaily binding contract; if you do not understand it. seek iegal advice before you sign. 
(2) This contract is intended to be filled in by lawyers or real estate brokers. All others seek professional advice. 
(3) To assure protection of certain priority rights in the Property, recordation of this contract and any assignments, addenda, or 
legally sufficient notices of interest is highly recommended. 
Parties. This contract, made end entered into this rflvaV °* A u g u s t 19 J z J L _ is by and between 
(hereafter collectively celled "Seller"), whose address is 6 3 4 9 S o u t h 1 3 0 0 W e s t , M u r r a y , UT 8 4 1 2 3 
ttnd MURRAY PARKWAY ASSOCIATES. L . L . C . , a Utah L im i t ed L i a b i l i t y Company 
(hArr tWftftrrnllBrfii/nlYr«llnH"R..yAr") -Whnci>iiriHr^^k 6 3 0 5 S O U t h 1 3 0 0 W e S t , M u r r a y , UT & 4 1 2 3 
2. Property. Seller agrees to sell and Euyer agrees to buy the real property (the "Property") located at A p p r o x i m a t e I V U . 4 H a C r G 
vacant ground
 (s l re i ! l addreSs). in the city of Murray County of Sa l t Lake 
State of Utah, described as: 
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
3. Date of Possession. Seller agrees to deliver possession and Buyer agrees to enter into possession of the Property on the day of 
August iq 95. 
4. Price and Payment. Buyer agrees to pay for the Property the purchase price of Q p P r Q X " ! ^ t e l y T H I R T E E N T H O U S A i N u - — 
TWO HI INORFD a n d 0 0 / 1 0 0 
Dollars ($ 1 J * C \ J \ J * LIU ) payable at Seller's address above given. 
or to Seller's order, on the following terms: Tv/0 H u n d r e d a n d 0 0 / 1 0 0 
Dollars (5 <iuU . UU ) down payment, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of fl P P r Q X Ifllrj t f i 1v TH1RTFFN 
THOUSAND a n c i O O / 1 0 0 — J"JLTDollars ($ 1<J ^ UUU . UU ) being paid as follows: 
The total purchase price will be the exact final acreage calculation multiplied by $30,000, 
per acre. The total balance due shall be paid in full upon the recordation of the subdivi< 
plat for MURRAY PARKWAY ESTATES SUBDIVISION. 
Seller agrees to execute a Warranty Deed in favor of Buyer to be held in Escrow at Merrill 
Title Company until such time as the entire cash balance has been paid in full to Seller. 
Buyer and Seller agree to exchange an equal amount of acreage (approximately 1.08 acres) 
to accomodate the Buyer's development of MURRAY PARKWAY ESTATES SUBDIVISION, said exchange 
will be for an equal amount of land presently being purchased by the Buyer from Douglas A. 
and Leone S. Parker, which exchange parcel will join the property being retained by Seller 
on the North. Seller and Buyer will execute the necessary Warranty Deeds for the exchange 
as soon as the final legal descriptions have been determined by an accurate survey. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.v/-N'fvZCiJML>Lu V . A : L T O . 
SPACE A B O V E THIS LINE FOR RECORDER 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
C A U T I O N : R E A D B E F O R E Y O U SIGN 
ft) This is a legally binding contract: if you do not understand it. seek legal advice before you sign. 
(2) This contract is intended to be filled in by lawyers or real estate brokers. All others seek professional advice. 
(3) To assure protection of certain priority rights in the Property, recordation of this contract and any assignments, addenda, or 
legol/y sufficient notices of interest is highly recommended. 
1. Partiof, Th[s contrac 
and ELIZABETH M. 
ndenteredimo.his 28th
 d8yo f August , 9 _ii is by e n d b e t w 6 e n UDELL G. PARKER 
' Tms tpps o f THF PARKFR FAMII Y TRUST: and HAZEL PARKER SIMPSON 
13UU West, Murray, Ul b 4 i Z i (hefeaf^r^cglleqiive^callo^-S, 
ond 
6421 and 6441 Sout MAv'yMw^^fettTerffi'. c°: a m^L ted L i a b i I i t y Comgan (hfffffafiarcnllfieiivfl-lyenllQd-Riiyflr") whncn utirir^<i\< 6 3 0 5 S O U t h 1 3 0 0 W e S t , M u r r a y , UT B 4 1 2 3 
2. Property. Seller agrees to sell and Buyor agrees to buy the real property (the "Property") located at A p p r o x i m a t e l y D o b U P O U C H 
Crvstal River Drive (street address), in the City of M u r r a y
 # County of Sd 11 L a k e 
State of Utah, described os: 
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 





4. Price and Payment. .Buyer career to pay/or the Property the purchase price of T h r e e H u n d r e d E i a h t V O n e T h o u s a n d 
Two Hundred & 00/100 D o l l a r s (approximate ly)
 Do!,ars {$ 381, ^UO. UU payflh|ft at ^ ^^ a H ^ , ***** given. 
Or to Siller's nrripr• nn thw fnllnwinn turms- F J f t V T h p U S a n d a n d 0 0 / 1 0 0 
Dollars ( $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) down payrnent. receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and th 
(approximately) Thousand iwo Hundred & 00/100 Dollars 
ghaunrpnf Three Hundred inirtv Une 
Dollars (5 3 o l , Z 0 0 . 0 Q being paid as follows: 
Fifty Thousand and 00/100 dollars due and payable upon the recordation of the Subdivision 
Plat. The remaining 5281,200.00 (approximately) will be paid in the amount of S6,248.89 
principal, together with any accrued interest due and payable upon the closing of each of 
the first 45 lots of the 50 lots developed on the Seller's property shown on the proposed 
plat of MURRAY PARKWAY ESTATES SUBDIVISION that fall within the boundary of the land being 
purchased hereunder. Interest will accrue at 10% per annum on the unpaid balance commenci 
2 years from the recording of the subdivision plat. At the time the legal .descriptions ar 
finalized, Buyers and Sellers agree to execute the Necessary documents to convert the term 
of this Contract to a Note and First Trust Deed, including a Warranty Deed to convey fee 
title to the Buyers. These documents will be held in Escrow by Merrill Title Company and 
recorded simultaneously with the first phase of the subdivision to consumate the conversio 
/ v \ M cy^j^o f^OL^cX ~n^ L ^ % --?*~?5T ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ 
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•NOTE:Trustee must be a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, building and loan association or savings and loan association 
authorized to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in Utah; or a title insurance 
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B Cyprus Credit Union Mp.mhp.r Statp.mp.nt 
Magna Branch 
:J50r> So. 8400 UVsc 
(801)250-7201 
Midvalley Branch 
575u So. Redwood Road 
(S01) 968-0286 
West Jordan Branch 
1381 W. 90th South 
(801) 250-9021 
Operations Center 
3505 So. 8400 West 






ALLSTATE LEGAL SUPPLY CO 
PARKER ENT LTD PARTNERSHIP 
DALE S PARKER 
1772 W DOVE HOLLOW CIR 
SLC UT 84118 
74823 
STATEMENT DATE: FROM 01FEB96 TO 
PAGE 1 
31MAR96 
HOME LOANS. INCLUDING 1ST MORTGAGE AND HOME EQUITY. NEW AND USED AUTOS AND VISA—OUR RATES ARE LOW ON 
lYTHING WHICH MEANS YOU'LL SAVE MONEY ON YOUR MONTHLY PAYMENTS BY 'FINANCING AT CYPRUS. LEAVE A MESSAGE WITH 
X (PAN INFORMATION DIM OUR MPW I QAN-RY-PHONF SVSTPM AIMn WPI 1 ftPT R A ^ WITM vnn PlftMT AWAV PAH ^ V Q O O n 
S1 SHARE A/C - REGULAR SHARES 
E DESCRIPTION 
(Joint with CARLA K PARKER) 
Previous Balance 
331* DIVIDEND CREDIT 




Annual Percentage Yield Earned: 3.38% 
For the Period from 01/01 through 03/31. 
MAR31 Closing Date...New Balance 
S5 SHARE A/C - SHAREDRAFT CHECKING 
E DESCRIPTION 
(Joint with CARLA K PARKER) 
Previous Balance „ „ 
7 T'FER TO 50830L20 &u.r« £o 
331# DIVIDEND CREDIT 






Annual Percentage Yield Earned: 2.01% 
For the Period from 01/01 through 03/31, 




YEAR TO DATE DIV/INT 
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m Cyprus Credit Union Member Statement 
Magna Branch 
.T)05 So. 8400 West 
(801) 250-7201 
Midvalley Branch 
5750 So. Rodvvood Road 
(801)968-9286 
West Jordan Branch 
13S1 \V. 90th South 
(801)255-9621 
Operations Center 
3505 So. 8400 West 
Magna, UT 84044 
(801) 250-5858 
NCUA 
CARLA K PARKER 
1772 W DOVE HOLLOW CIR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84118 
50830 
STATEMENT DATE: FROM 01FEB96 TO 
PAGE 1 
31MAR96 
HOME LOANS, INCLUDING 1ST MORTGAGE AND HOME EQUITY, NEW AND USED AUTOS AND VISA--OUR RATES ARE LOW ON 
RYTHING WHICH MEANS YOU'LL SAVE MONEY ON YOUR MONTHLY PAYMENTS BY FINANCING AT CYPRUS. LEAVE A MESSAGE WITH 
R LOAN INFORMATION ON OUR NEW LOAN-BY-PHONE SYSTEM AND WEIL GET BACK WITH YOU RIGHT AWAY. CALL 252-9000. 
E DESCRIPTION 
Previous Balance 
T'FER TO 74021S5 
B7 CHECK DEPOSIT 
B28 CHECK DEPOSIT 

















DATE DESCRIPTION AMOUNT 
MAR31# DIVIDEND CREDIT 50.07 
Annual Percentage Yield Earned: 3.52% 
For the Period from 01/01 through 03/31. 




L20 LOAN A/C - NEW AUTO 
DATE DESCRIPTION 
FEB1 Previous Balance 
FEB1 * ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE 7.900 
FEB1 DAILY PERIODIC RATE 0.00021644 
FEB12 PAYMENT TR/M016 1201.00 
MAR6 PAYMENT TR#644 1201.00 
MAR7 CHECK PAYMENT 1201. 0J>-—>*x 
MAR27 T'FER FROM 74823S5<§00.007 










1190.75,. 46161 .21 
700.18 45^ cz 
461.03 
YEAR TO DATE DIV/INT 
S1 50.07 
Total 50.07 
YTO TAX INFORMATION 
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Cyprus Credit Union 
P.O. Box 326 
Magna, UT 84044 
lUb/c Cyprus Credit Union 
(801; 250-5858 P 0 Box 326 Magna, Utah 
14 MAY 1997 02:18PM PAGE: 1 
177c w Duv'E HOLLOW CIR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 64U5 
CLIENT NO. - 50830 
SOCIAL SEC. NO. - 529648182 
BRANCH - £ MIDVflLLEY DEPT - 99 NON-PAYROLL 
LISTING OF TRANSACTIONS FROM 81 JAN 1996 THROUGH 14 MAY 1997 
SI - REGULAR SHARES 
Eff. 
Op Date Posted Transaction 
96 i'aM% T'FER TO 659155 
98 19JAN96 T'FER TO 6591S5 
48 19JAN96 T'FER TO 6591S5 
29JAN96 CHECK DEPOSIT 
.4 29JAN96 T'FER TO 50630120 
54 02FEB96 T'FER TO 74021S5 
63 07FEB96 CHECK DEPOSIT 
63 21FE596 L^EIA CASHED 
Check 50.60 Casn Back 50.00 
90 23FEB96 dm DEPOSIT 
Check 1,787.11 Cash Back 400.00 
46 21MAR96 CASH WITHDRAWAL 
31 31MAR96 30MAR96 DIVIDEND CREDIT 
31 30MAR96 Annual Percentage Yieid Earnea: 3.52* 
31 30rtAR96 For tne Period fros 01/01 through 03/31. 
6 01APR96 u£Di DEPOSIT 
+3 waAPRvo T:FER TO 659133 
10 16APR96 7:FER TO 6551S5 
38 26MAY96 DEPOSIT TRs897 
Off-Us £5291.20 
29 10JUN96 T'FES T0 5M38S5 
6 13JUN96 CASH WITHDRAWAL 
53 20JUN96 DEPOSIT TF;;591 
Casn Back 200.03 Off-Us 169^.60 
M 26JUN96 T:FER 7u 5083055 
ii 30JUN96 29JUN96 DIVIDEND CREDIT 
ii 29JUN96 Annual Percentage Yield Earned; 3.70* 
ii 29JUN98 For tne Period froa 04/01 through 06/30. 
38SEP56 DIVIDEND CREDIT 
30SEP96 Annual Percentage Yield Earned: 3.36% 
7 30SEP96 Fcr ;ne Period froi 07/01 through 09/33. 











H/'Q Balance Chk No St a 




U, UU4. J J 























7 c:-i «o 
9,015.73 
i , t ' l j . tO 
i , « < i . - t n 
1,281.5/ 
i,061.57 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Cyprus Credit Union Member Statement 
Magna Branch 
:j:i()5 So. 8400 West 
(801)250-7201 
Mid valley Branch 
5750 So. Redwood Road 
(801)968-9286 
West Jordan Branch 
1381 W. 90th South 
(S01) 255-9621 
Operations Center 
3505 So. 8400 West 
Magna, UT 840*44 
(801)250-5858 
NCUA 
CARLA K PARKER 
1772 W DOVE HOLLOW CIR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84118 
50830 
STATEMENT DATE: FROM 01FEB96 „.
 P A G E 1 
TO ? 31MAR96 
HOME LOANS, INCLUDING 1ST MORTGAGE AND HOME EQUITY, NEW AND USED AUTOS AND VISA—OUR RATES ARE LOW ON 
RYTHING WHICH MEANS YOU'LL SAVE MONEY ON YOUR MONTHLY PAYMENTS BY FINANCING AT CYPRUS. LEAVE A MESSAGE WITH 
IR LOAN INFORMATION ON OUR NEW LOAN-BY-PHONE SYSTEM AND WEIL GET BACK WITH YOU RIGHT AWAY. CALL 252-9000. 
"E DESCRIPTION 
I Previous Balance 
! T'FER TO 74021S5 
:B7 CHECK DEPOSIT 
:B28 CHECK DEPOSIT 
!1 CASH WITHDRAWAL 












DATE DESCRIPTION AMOUNT 
MAR31* DIVIDEND CREDIT 50.07 
Annual Percentage Yield Earned: 3.52% 
For the Period from 01/01 through 03/31. 




L20 LOAN A / C - NEW AUTO 
DATE DESCRIPTION 
FEB1 Previous Balance 
FEB1 * ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE 7.900 
FEB1 DAILY PERIODIC RATE 0.00021644 
FEB12 PAYMENT TR/M016 1201.00 
MAR6 PAYMENT TR#644 1201.00 
MAR7 CHECK PAYMENT 1201.00- >v. 
MAR27 T'FER FROM 74823S5 <300.00j 























YEAR TO DATE DIV/INT 
S1 50.07 
Total 50.07 
YTO TAX INFORMATION 
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B Cyprus Credit Union Member Statement 
Magna Branch 
3505 So. 8400 West 
(801) 250-7201 
Midvalley Branch 
5750 So. Redwood Road 
(801) 968-9286 
West Jordan Branch 
1381 W. 90th South 
(801) 255-9621 
Operations Center 
3505 So. 8400 West 
Magna, UT 84044 
(801) 250-5858 
DALE S PARKER 
6305 S 1300 W 
MURRAY UT 84123 6733 
96770 
STATEMENT DATE: FROM 01APR96 
PAGE 1 
30APR96 
R AUTO LOAN RATES JUST WENT DOWN TO 6.90%,SO IF YOU HAVE A VEHICLE FINANCED SOMEWHERE ELSE, BRING IT TO 
S FOR REFINANCING AND TO SAVE MONEY: USE OUR LOAN-BY-PHONE AT 252-9000 TO SIGN UP FOR A FAST LOAN OVER THE 































































15 CASH DEPOSIT 
























St SHARE A/C 
AMOUNT 




































































































BALANCE , DATE 
50.27 | APR30 DESCRIPTION Closii 














































































































































Closing Date...New Balance 
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^ Cyprus Credit Union Member Statement 
Magna Branch 
3505 So. 8400 West 
(801) 250-7201 
Midvalley Branch 
5760 So. Redwood Road 
(801) 968-9286 
West Jordan Branch 
1381 W. 90th South 
(801) 255-9621 
Operations Center 
3505 So. 8400 West 
Magna, UT 84044 
(801) 250-5858 
NCUA 
DALE S PARKER 
6305 SOUTH 1300 WEST 
ASPEN VIEW HOMES CONSTRUCT 
MURRAY UT 84123 
57172 
STATEMENT DATE: FROM 01APR96 TO 
PAGE 1 
30APR96 
)UR AUTO LOAN RATES JUST WENT DOWN TO 6.90%, SO IF YOU HAVE A VEHICLE FINANCED SOMEWHERE ELSE, BRING IT TO 
VS FOR REFINANCING AND TO SAVE MONEY. USE OUR LOAN-BY-PHONE AT 252-9000 TO SIGN UP FOR A FAST LOAN OVER TH 
DNE. SEE US FOR YOUR FIRST MORTGAGE LOAN. WE CAN HELP FROM START TO, FINISH WITH ALL YOUR BORROWING NEEDS. 
E DESCRIPTION 
S1 SHARE A/C - REGULAR SHARES 
AMOUNT BALANCE DATE DESCRIPTION 
(Joint with PARKER CARLA K.) 
Previous Balance 51.26 
APR30 Closing Date...New Balance 










APR18 CHECK COPY FEE #5592 
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'IONS BANK 
STATEMENT DATE 
APRIL 18, 1996 
PAGE 1 
ll..l..l..l...llll...l...l.l..ll„l„.ll,.,.ll,l,l,ll,„l.l,.l 
CARLA K PARKER 
150 E VINE ST 
MURRAY UT 84l07~1*831 
V 
For 24-Hour Account Information 
call Rtddi-Ruponjt at 97<f-S,W0 
<orl-S00-789-2265 
017-37058-6 
ARY PRODUCT DESCRIPTION ACCOUNT NUMBER 
ILE 
EXECUTIVE SUPER GOLD-MMA 017-37058-6 
KING 017-37058-6 EXECUTIVE SUPER 
UNT PREVIOUS DEPOSITS/CREDITS.. 
BALANCE NO AMOUNT MO 
719.24 3 17,454.27 6 














AMOUNT DATE. . 
371.44 03/25 
47.00 03/25 
10.00 SERVICE FEE 
ILY BALANCE 
3/21 300.80 03/29 
3/25 229.80 04/12 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE YIELD EARNED 2.01% 













... OTHER CHARGES... 
AMOUNT NO AMOUNT 
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Bank 
First Intarstata Bank of Utah, N.A. 
180 South Main 
Salt Laka City. UT 81101 
REALTY BROKERS PERFORflANCE 
GEHERAL ACCOUNT 
150 E VINE ST 
MURRAY UT 84107-1831 
*841074831509* 
Coaaorclal Checking 
April 1 - April 30. 1996 
Pag* 1 of 3 46 
Account No. 00021042197 
Questions about your 
account? 
Call our 
Day It Night Banking CantaV-* 
at 801 864 8020 
April 30. 1996 
Beginning ladgar balanct 
Dtposits 
Elactronlc dtposits/bank cradits 
Total Cradits 
Chacks 
Elactronic dabits'bank dabits 
Total Dabits 
Ending ladgar batanca 
Daposits 




Total Daposlts ( 6 itaas) 
TOTAL DEPOSITS/CREDITS ( 6 itaas) 
Chacks 
Nuabar Data Aaount 
300 04/12 434.14 































Notai An astarisk(a) naxt to any chack listad about aaans thara has bat>| 
stqutnct of your chacks 
Bank 
Coaaarclal Checking 
April 1 - April 30. 1996 
Pagt 2 of 3 





































































































































Nottt An astariskC*) naxt to any chtck listad ebovt aaans thtra has btt 
saquanca of your chacks 
Total Chacks ( 46 itaas) $ 30.860.73 
























































00000058612294 : ~ 

























a brtak In tha nuaarical 
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_ Co«»trcial Chaeking 
April 1 - April 30, 1996 
Dally todgtr balanct 
Pagt 3 of 3 








ly ltdgtr balanct 





Currant month aviragi ltdgtr balance 






PLEASE RECONCILE THIS STATEMENT WITHIN 30 DAYS. WHEN INQUIRING ABOUT 
TRANSACTIONS. INCLUDE A FULL DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEflCS). ALSO. PLEASE t££ REVERSE 
SIDE AND ANY ACCOMPANYING STATEMEHKS) FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION. 
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America's neighborhood bank" Key Organization Checking 
440690002777 
March 29, 1996 
^BANK 
;ey Bank of Utah 
KeyCorp Bank 
Account No. 440690002777 
B 00069 00002 REM B1 
SUNRISE FLATS LLC 
1772 WEST DOVE HOLLOW CIRCLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84118-1492 
Page 1 of 2 
Questions About Your Accounts 
Call Key Express 
24 hours a day, 7 days a week: 
1-800-KEY2YOU (1-800-539-2988) 
II..I..I..I...II...III..I....II.I..II.I....I.III...II.....I.II 
STATEMENT PERIOD: 03/01/96 - 03/31/96 ACCOUNT NO.: 440690002777 
?$iinifnajrj-
9 
Beginning balance as of 03/01/96 $457.69 Less 1 check(s) paid 700.00 
Plus 1 deposit(s) 1,000.00 Less service charges/fees 7.50 
Ending balance as of 03/31/96 $750.19 
w w i i f i ^ ^ 
Deposits 
Posted Effective Serial 
Date Date Number Description Amount 
03/12 03/12 Customer Deposit...'. 1,000.00 
1 deposes) totaling $1,000.00 
~^^f -Checks:Paid ' •*•v?3!^?$t?* indicates"ai break (hhumefical l^quence:| H-:-:?: J v ^ i ^ ^ 
Check No. Date Amount Check No. Date Amount Check No. Date Amount 
5 
1042....03/18 700.00 
Withdrawals and Other Charges 
Service Charges 





Number Description Amount 
Maintenance Service Charge 7.50 











03/12/96 1 1,000.00 1,457.69 
03/18/96 1 700.00 757.6? 
03/29/96 1 7.50 750.' 
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•Q. First I Interstate 
Bank Salt Lak« Ci ty, UT 84101 
DOVE HOLLOW I C 
150 E VINE ST 
HURRAY UT 841G7-4031 
^811074831509* 
BusIness Savings 
April 1 - June 30, 1996 
Page 1 of 2 R00 
Account no. 21186416 
Questions about your 
accoun t? 
CaI I our I 
Day & Night Banking CentJr-
at (801) 264-8020 
Write: 
Hurray Office 
1920 South State 
Hurray UT 84107 
For your IF YOUR CURRENT SUPPLY OF FIRST INTERSTATE CHECKS IS RUNNING LOW, PLEASE 
Information REORDER AS YOU NORMALLY WOULD. WELLS FARGO WILL CONTINUE TO PROCESS 
YOUR FIRST INTERSTATE CHECKS EVEN AFTER YOUR ACCOUNTS CONVERT. CUR GOAL 







Buj ii ioi::s: Sa< Ings 
Account number 21186416 
B e g i n n i n g Balance 
Additions (•) 






... earned percentage 
%P39.'09 V i , l d "r"!-d *»'»»-»•»'• 
Interest 
paid 
2.52% * 77.94 





** i n »» 
Q First '. Interstate 
Bank , 
Business Savings 
April 1 - June 30, 1996 Page 2 of 2 
Account no: 21186416 
Account SERVICE CHARGES 
Activity YOU DID HOT HAVF TO PAY THE $3.00 SERVICE CHARGE OH YOUR ACCOUNT THIS 
continued PERIOD BECAUSE YOUR MINIMUM BALANCE WAS MORE THAN $100.00. 
How your interest was calculated 
Avg. daily collected balance $ 6,289.74 
Avg. interest rate X 2.49962X 
Days this period ( 91) C 366 X .248633 
Interest earned this period = $ 39.09 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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/(S? J> ' / ' / / / ? /vx-^/ 
nnot tell you one thing that's going to prejudice Y£E by 
valuing the estate at the time of trial. Mr, ParkrfF has 
articulated lots of ways that it will prejudice Jflm, 
E COURT: Tl lank yoi i. 
Rebu\tal, Ms. Donovan? 
MS. DONOVAN: Your Honor, without belaboring the 
credi bil it> i ssi le, I'Vth. \\ \ =: :• * g- to he .ar a 1 ot 
of testimony about how>both : the parties have handled 
their financial dealings ^ particularly Mr. Parker, in 
trying to hide money from m$vcli#ht and that he was having 
an affair with her best friend\ 
terms of 5iirnng\lrs. Parker, c] earl y i t 
hurts Mrs. Parker if you^ion't use r^e date of divorce, 
because she's relied \#on what the Com!ld.ssioner said. And 
y i . : :>perties. 
Had she ever knotffi that Mr. Parker would be^ntitled to 
some of that,jshe never would have done that, 
so I think that, in terms of fairn^es, in 
terms ajFwhat this Court previously said, we would V g u e 
strenuously that the date of the divorce should be th^^ate 
valuation, And I'll submit it on that basis. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
There have bene a couple of different areas that, 
counsel, youfve covered today, and so let me address those. 
And, although this motion doesn't really deal with income 
si le l s i i ivested substantial amounts c »f 
<u 
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specifically, income is mentioned in the course of your 
memos and in your argument, so I'd like to sort that out 
first. 
In terms of general rules, I intend to use the 
date of the divorce as the date of valuation, and that's 
where I'll start. 
As to whether or not these parties had a 
continuing business relationship, I think that is not 
applicable to how the Court divides up the property. And 
the reason that I don't think it's applicable is, it sounds 
as though, from what I understand about the business 
relationship, that what would happen as a result of this is 
that they would both derive some income. 
I don't think that, since everybody's agreed this 
is not an alimony issue, I don't think it matters whether 
they derived this income before the decree or after the 
decree was entered. And so, in terms of looking at their 
business relationship, I'm not persuaded by that that there 
ought to be a different date used. 
I think, in terms of any exceptions to the rule 
that I've cited, and that is the date of the divorce, those 
would — there would be two exceptions to that in which I 
would consider using a different date. One is if either 
party has used a marital asset to increase the value of 
something else that they have. And that's, in particular, 
30 
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the home that Ms. Parker resides in. 
There's an allegation that hht used mai i t a I funds 
or a marital asset to increase its value after the divorce. 
If I'm « nonvi need that that's true then I would vary from my 
general rule and I would value it as of the date of tri^l 
The second area in which I would make an 
excepti on I s i f I believe, after 1 learing the evi dence, that 
either party has either hidden an asset from the other 
party or has tried to hide the value r\ * na*- property, then 
I think I'd have - - I'd want 1: :< :> t .ake - -r -.- -J . ••. ~ 
property a different value. Because, in my mind, somebody 
who's going to do that is acting obstructively. And I 
think that I'd be inclined to take a look at why that 
occurred and perhaps use a different valuation date. 
Those: are the two _ areas in which I would be 
inclined to take a look at. And-those would go as to any 
particular property. I would not look at valuing the 
entire mar ita ] estate at the date of the tria1 j I Ist because 
I became convinced that one party, or both parties, tried 
to hide an asset; I'd simply look at that particular asset. 
This is really not part of your motion, but it's 
been talked about a little bit and I guess I just need to 
make my position clear. In terms of what constitutes 
marital estate, I think that it's — there's a presumption 
that the marital estate is whatever either one of these 
31 
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people acquired in interest prior to the time of the 
decree. I don't think the rule is: If it's in my name, 
it's mine and, if it's in your name, it's yours. I think 
I'd be taking a look at everything to see what part of the 
marital estate is. And I just need to make that clear. 
And, finally, as I pointed out before, one of the 
arguments that the respondent makes is that, if we try to 
freeze-frame this, we're going to run into a problem 
because there would be some properties in the middle of 
development. I think that's going to occur no matter what 
valuation date we use. 
And it seems to me that, when parties become 
divorced — although that's not the time the Court receives 
the evidence on the other issues, that's when their legal 
relationship ends. It's when parties are entitled to 
believe that they can begin a new life and they're entitled 
to make separate decisions with regard to assets and debts 
and — and I think they're entitled to rely on the division 
of their legal entanglements, if you will, with the other 
party. 
So I think it's reasonable to use the general 
rule, even though I acknowledge that I didn't see a case 
either where the bifurcation occurred and then a trial 
later. I simply think the same underpinnings apply in 
terms of reasoning. 
32 
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'A 
want to — we believe that the Court needs to clarify that 
that is a marital asset that needs to be divided, and there 
needs to be some requirement that Ms. Parker cooperate in 
providing verification, providing an outline immediately as 
to what expenses she's indicating she's going to have to 
pay from that, so that we can — so that we can have a full 
understanding of what Mr. Parkerfs entitled to there. 
Certainly, the receipt of those two checks, the 
receipt of the $32,000 on the Kevin Gates transaction, are 
all newly discovered evidence, and we do believe that there 
is an error on the part of Your Honor in — as it relates 
to Murray Parkway, in trying to do other than divide the 
membership of Murray Parkway, LLC, because the value of 
that is so speculative, the future value is so speculative 
that, as with stocks, you divide the membership. It isn't 
difficult to do. It isn't compli-cated, as Counsel would 
have the Court believe. The membership can be divided up. 
We would ask that the Court consider our motions. 
And thank you for your time. 
THE COURT: Thanks, Counsel. 
Let me go ahead and make some rulings on the 
motions that are before the Court today. I did have an 
opportunity to read all of the memos that you supplied me 
ahead of time, so I'm prepared on that. Except as to the 
motion for TRO and to reopen the case. I did not review 
°6 22 
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that for today. I can speak to part of it. But, frankly, 
I'm not prepared to deal with the rest of it. And so let 
me handle it in this fashion. 
The respondent filed a motion for TRO and to 
reopen the case that was filed about the same time, I 
think, that my memorandum decision went out. And there 
were two areas that that dealt with. I can rule on one 
today, and that is dealing with the properties that were 
sold by the petitioner. 
I don't find a basis to grant the respondent's 
motion relative to the two properties that the petitioner 
sold, for the same reason that I determined that properties 
would be — or, excuse me — that assets would be valued as 
of the date of the divorce. That was dealt with either at 
trial or prior to trial, and I don't recall which. But, in 
reality, there were numerous properties that each of the 
parties had in their control. And they separately made 
decisions about those properties after the divorce. They 
made, for example, investment decisions or other decisions 
regarding those properties and, I believe, were entitled 
then to take the profit or loss, as the case may be, based 
upon those individual decisions that they made following 
the divorce. They went on with their lives and handled 
those properties separately and individually. 
And so, for that reason, I felt that it was 
23 
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appropriate to value those properties as of the date of the 
divorce• And, for the same reason, I don't think it's 
appropriate for me to revisit the issue of whether the 
petitioner was entitled to keep whatever profits that she 
might have made over and above the value that was 
determined at the time of trial. 
There were some properties, I think, that were in 
a different category, and those were properties that either 
weren't valued as of the date of the divorce, because there 
wasn't an appraisal done on them, or because nobody really 
did anything independently with those properties. And 
those were the properties that were ordered to be sold and 
the proceeds divided as of the date of sale. And so I 
think those properties, of necessity, were in a different 
category. Frankly, had they all been able to be handled as 
of the date of the divorce, I think that would have been 
preferable. 
So for that reason, I do not find a basis to 
grant the respondent's motion for temporary restraining 
order. I do not recall the evidence regarding the Kevin 
Gates receivable. I can't speak to that today. I don't 
know if the ruling that I made handled that issue or 
whether it did not. What I would ask counsel to do is, if 
there's a further ruling that needs to be made, please file 
a notice to submit on that, and then I'll go back and 
24 
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review the pleadings relative to that issue. But I'm 
simply not able to do it today. 
On the objection to the supplemental findings, 
it's my understanding that the lis pendens issue has been 
stipulated to, and I appreciate that because I wasn't able 
to go back and review what we did at trial and I didn't 
remember. 
What I'm going to do in the supplemental findings 
and other documents that I received is I'm going to line 
out whatever paragraphs or sentences there are about the 
lis pendens and then ask that a separate order be prepared 
relative to your stipulation. And then that can also 
include the stipulation and order on the line of credit. 
That does appear to be a separate stipulation that the 
parties have made, and I'll .approve that and ask that that 
be included. 
In terms of the objection on the supplemental 
findings as to the Murray Parkway issue, I'm going to deny 
the respondent's objection. My memo was not intended to be 
all-inclusive of everything that I found. It was intended 
to be skeletal in nature. That's typically what I do and I 
rely on counsel to flesh out that skeletal memorandum, and 
I think that's what Ms. Donovan's findings do. So I will 
include those. 
And in terms of the respondent's motion for a new 
25 
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trial, I'm going to deny that also. You know, I guess if I 
2 I made some errors, I'm going to need to have an appellate 
3 court tell me that I did so. We did try this case for five 
4 days, and I think that both sides had a complete and fair 
5 opportunity to present whatever evidence they wanted to 
6 present, and I don't find a basis, reviewing the pleadings, 
to grant a new trial. 
There are a couple of ancillary issues that have 
been argued today that I'll address. 
Relative to the bond monies, I will require the 
petitioner to provide an accounting to the respondent as to 
the bond monies that she has received. And should any be 
received by her in the future, that same order will be in 
place, that she provide an accounting at the time of her 
receipt and distribution of those funds. 
I also find that the utility check on the Sunrise 
Flats property should be divided as to its net proceeds. 
What I'm going to order, however, is that that check be 
made available to the plaintiff — to the petitioner, 
excuse me. The respondent is to receive one-half of the 
net proceeds, but she's entitled to have that check 
initially to make whatever distribution is necessary to be 
made to provide an accounting, and then, finally, to give 
to him his net one-half proceeds of the amount that she's 
entitled to. 
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